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Determinants of Bystander Behaviour during School Bullying:  
The Role of Moral Disengagement, Personality, and Friendship 
 
Caroline Doramajian, Ph.D. 
Concordia University, 2014 
School bullying is a prevalent problem in Canadian schools and is associated with 
multiple negative outcomes. Students are often present during bullying incidents as 
natural observers, or bystanders, who may take on various participant roles that either 
aggravate or improve the plight of victims. The overarching objective of the current 
three-part study was to identify predictors of bystander behaviour during bullying 
situations in order to guide interventions aimed at recruiting children to defend their 
victimized peers. This goal was achieved by designing a three-wave longitudinal study 
that spanned 4 months and that sampled 130 Canadian early adolescents (68 boys, 62 
girls; Mean age= 11.36 years) . Participants completed computerized questionnaires 
assessing self-reported moral disengagement, self- and peer-reported bullying-related 
behaviours, friendship using a sociometric nomination procedure, and personality 
operationalized as BIS-BAS sensitivity using a cognitive task. The data were analyzed 
using structural equation modeling in MPlus. In the first study, the over-time interplay 
between moral disengagement and both defending and passive bystanding behaviours 
was investigated, resulting in an overall pattern that was consistent with Bandura’s 
(1999) socio-cognitive theory of moral agency. Findings also revealed important sex 
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differences and methodological issues, particularly with regard to the use of peer-report 
versus self-report tools. Study 2 examined concurrent associations among moral 
disengagement, personality, and multiple peer-reported bystander behaviours, including 
defending, passive bystanding, and bully reinforcing. Study 2 provided partial support for 
the postulates of both Bandura’s (1999) theory and Gray and McNaughton’s (2000) 
reinforcement sensitivity theory by highlighting the moderating effect of the BIS and the 
BAS on the association between moral disengagement and bystander behaviours. Study 3 
moved beyond the individual in order to investigate the contextual nature of morality and 
defending behaviour. As expected, the association between moral disengagement and 
defending became more positive as a function of the victimization level of one’s best 
friend. Taken as a whole, findings provide support for the role of personality, morality 
and friendship in influencing bystander behaviours during bullying situations. Several 
directions for future research are proposed in order to better inform youth-led 
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Determinants of Bystander Action during School Bullying: 
The Role of Moral Disengagement, Personality, and Friendship 
General Introduction 
School bullying – also referred to as peer victimization – has been linked with 
multiple negative psychosocial outcomes (Hawker & Boulton, 2000). These acts of 
physical, verbal, or relational aggression may be especially problematic during early 
adolescence because they may exacerbate difficulties associated with normative 
developmental challenges (e.g., puberty, school transitions). With Canada ranking among 
the worst of 35 countries on a World Health Organization survey comparing reports of 
bullying and victimization (Craig & Harel, 2004), it is clear that school violence is a 
critical societal concern. There is a vital need to learn how to curb the prevalence of 
bullying and its detrimental effects. While adults play an important role in contributing to 
a safe school environment, their direct influence is hindered by the reality that as children 
age bullying takes on more covert forms that are difficult for adults to detect (Crick, 
Nelson Morales, Cullerton-Sen, Casas, &Hickman, 2001). Peers are natural observers of 
bullying, and harnessing their efforts to intervene is imperative. The ultimate goal of the 
current project was to provide knowledge that might serve such youth-led interventions. 
Salmivalli and colleagues (Salmivalli, Lagerspetz, Björkqvist, Österman, & 
Kaukiainen, 1996) have offered a framework that is ideally suited for this endeavor. 
Their participant role approach, which has only recently been pursued in Canada, 
conceptualizes bullying as a social phenomenon that arises within a peer group context. 
Bullying is therefore thought to extend beyond the bully-victim dyad to encompass the 
large number of bystanders who are often present during bullying incidents (Craig & 
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Pepler, 1997). These peer bystanders may assume different roles that either perpetuate or 
impede bullying incidents. For instance, bully reinforcers actively reward the aggressor 
by cheering and laughing, while passive bystanders may unintentionally encourage 
bullies because their silence may be interpreted as complicity with the acts of aggression. 
In contrast, bystanders may also take on a defender role by standing up for victims in a 
way that blocks the bully’s aggression. Based on the premise that social roles are 
malleable (Hastings, Utendale, & Sullivan, 2007), the participant role approach aims to 
reduce violence by identifying ways of recruiting youth to adopt a victim defender role. 
While all aggressive acts have the potential to inflict harm, bullying is a 
particularly unjust form of aggression given that it involves a power imbalance between 
aggressor and victim. As such, bullying incidents present bystanders (and certainly 
bullies as well) with a moral dilemma. While many contextual and personal factors likely 
influence behaviour in such situations (e.g., Caravita, DiBlasio, & Salmivalli, 2009), 
understanding factors that inhibit moral action in a morally compelling situation targets 
the theoretical core of the problem. Bandura’s socio-cognitive theory of moral agency 
(Bandura, 1986, 1999, 2002) proposes that aggression – or lack of prosocial behaviour– 
in bullying situations may be due to mechanisms of moral disengagement. Moral 
disengagement is a cognitive strategy used to legitimize aggression when one has 
violated or anticipates violating one’s own moral code.  It has been argued that moral 
disengagement suppresses moral emotions (e.g., empathy, guilt), which in turn loosens 
moral self-censures thus allowing for guilt-free aggression – or in the case of bystanders, 
guilt-free passivity in the face of another’s suffering. Moreover, the theory proposes that 
disengagement strategies develop gradually through a continual interplay between “moral 
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thought, affect, action, and its social reception” (Bandura, 2002). In other words, Bandura 
proposes that a bidirectional relationship exists between moral disengagement and 
behaviour that unfolds over time through processes of social learning. While recent 
research efforts have produced ample evidence to support an association between moral 
disengagement and bullying and other forms of aggression (e.g., Menesini, Sanchez, 
Fonzi, Ortega, Costable, & Feudo, 2003; Hymel, Rocke-Henderson, & Bonanno, 2005) 
research into the role of moral disengagement in predicting bystander behaviour is in its 
infancy. 
The objective of the current project was to contribute to this new and important 
area of inquiry by carrying out three studies. This task was accomplished using an 
intensive three-wave longitudinal design that sampled a diverse group of Canadian early 
adolescents over a four month-period and that benefitted from a multi-method 
computerized assessment procedure. The study presented in Chapter 1was an 
investigation of the over-time interplay between moral disengagement and both defender 
and passive bystander behaviours. This study aimed to improve upon the concurrent 
designs that have been predominantly employed in previous research, while also 
highlighting several methodological issues involving the measurement of moral 
disengagement and bystander behaviour.  
The goal of the second and third studies was to examine moderators of the 
association between moral disengagement and bystander behaviours. This line of 
investigation acknowledges the multi-dimensional and complex nature of human 
behaviour (Bronfenbrenner, 1979), which is certainly supported by the less than perfect 
association between moral disengagement and bullying-related behaviours that has been 
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found to date (e.g., Menesini et al., 2003). Chapter 2 describes a study that explored the 
interactive effect of morality and personality in predicting several bystander behaviours 
(i.e., defending, passive bystanding, and bully reinforcing). By joining the basic premises 
of Bandura’s socio-cognitive theory of moral agency (Bandura, 1999) with Gray and 
McNaughton’s (2000) reinforcement sensitivity theory, bystander behaviours were 
conceptualized according to their degree of prosociality versus aggression as well as their 
degree of activity versus passivity, and thought to vary as a function of both personality 
and moral cognitions. The aim of Study 2 was to shed light on the complexity of 
individual level factors involved in bystanders’ motivation to help or to harm victims.   
The study presented in Chapter 3 probed into the contextual nature of morality 
and moral agency. Specifically, it enquired into whether the level of victimization of 
one’s best friend would moderate the association between moral disengagement and 
defending behaviour. Children’s tendency to be more or less partial toward friends was 
expected to correspond to differential levels of defending. Hypotheses were based on the 
premise that children would have a separate moral code for friends and non-friends 
(Bukowski & Sippola, 1996), and that this moral partiality would be strongest in those 
who were most morally disengaged. The main purpose of Study 3 was to elaborate on the 





Chapter 1: A Longitudinal Study of the Associations Between Moral Disengagement 
and Active Defending Versus Passive Bystanding During Bullying Situations 
Researchers have long recognized the critical role that student bystanders play in 
either reducing or in amplifying bullying behaviour in schools (Lagerspetz, Björkqvist, 
Berts, & King, 1982; Salmivalli et al., 1996). Beyond bullies and victims, bystanders who 
witness bullying episodes participate in the overall process in more or less positive ways 
depending on their degree of activity versus passivity and prosociality versus aggression 
(Salmivalli, Voeten, & Poskiparta, 2011; Sutton & Smith, 1999). Indeed, the presence of 
peer bystanders has been shown to be related to the persistence of bullying episodes in 
that those bystanders who passively spectate as well as those who take on more active 
bully reinforcing roles (e.g., cheering and laughing) may provide rewards that maintain 
the bully’s aggressive behaviour (Salmivalli et al., 1996; O’Connell, Pepler, & Craig, 
1999). Unfortunately, despite the large proportion of children who are present during 
instances of bullying, few act as defenders of victimized peers (e.g., Craig & Pepler, 
1997; Salmivalli et al., 1996). As such, identifying factors that may motivate passive 
bystanders to act in defense of victims is a very worthwhile direction that researchers 
have recently begun to follow. 
Moral Disengagement 
Bystanders of school bullying are faced with a fundamentally unjust situation 
given that these incidents involve a power imbalance between perpetrator and victim. 
Bandura’s socio-cognitive theory of moral agency (Bandura, 1986, 1999, 2002) offers an 
explanation for why moral agency may be suppressed in such situations. The theory 
postulates that mismatches between moral principles (e.g., “the right thing to do is to help 
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the victim”) and actual conduct (e.g., remaining passive) are facilitated by a self-
regulatory cognitive strategy called moral disengagement. Moral disengagement is the 
tendency to legitimize harmful behaviour in a way that reduces one’s moral agency or 
accountability. Disengagement of moral self-sanctions from moral transgressions is 
selective in that this strategy is only thought to be necessary in situations when one 
anticipates committing acts that are against one’s moral code, or when one has already 
done so. As such, moral disengagement may be considered a coping mechanism to deal 
with cognitive dissonance between thought and behaviour (Festinger, 1957).  
According to the theory, moral disengagers are less likely to incur feelings of guilt 
and self-condemnation if they deviate from their code. The theory also proposes a gradual 
interplay over time between moral disengagement and moral action such that moral 
disengagement becomes a habitual strategy that allows for progressively worse moral 
transgressions. In other words, the individual may become desensitized to immoral action 
and its effects over time and it becomes easier, or less guilt-provoking to commit further 
or more severe transgressions. The theory describes eight psychosocial mechanisms of 
moral disengagement that are thought to inhibit moral self-censure and thus motivate 
immoral behaviour (Bandura, 1999). One group of mechanisms involves the cognitive 
restructuring of one’s beliefs such that an immoral act is not perceived to be all that 
reprehensible. This feat is achieved through processes such as moral justification (e.g., 
the belief that being bullied is just a normal part of growing up), advantageous 
comparison (e.g., believing that insulting someone is better than hitting them), and 
euphemistic labeling (e.g., believing that hitting an annoying classmate teaches them a 
‘lesson’). Moral disengagement is also thought to be facilitated by misrepresenting the 
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detrimental effects that result from moral transgressions. Here, individuals minimize, 
ignore, or misconstrue the painful consequences that victims may experience (e.g., 
believing that teasing someone does not really hurt them). A third group of mechanisms 
obscures one’s sense of moral agency through displacement of responsibility or diffusion 
of responsibility (e.g., believing that one should not help a victim because others are not 
helping him or her either). Finally, harmful acts may be rationalized as morally 
acceptable by dehumanizing victims and blaming them for having somehow provoked 
their own mistreatment (e.g., the belief that children who get mistreated usually do 
something to deserve it).  
Moral Disengagement and Bystander Behaviour 
Bandura’s framework has enhanced our understanding of aggressive behaviour in 
youth (e.g., Bandura, Barbaranelli, Caprara, & Pastorelli, 1996; Gini, Pozzoli, & Hymel, 
2013; Paciello, Fida, Tramontano, Lupinetti, & Caprara, 2008), and has also been found 
to be a reliable construct in understanding bullying behaviour (e.g., Menesini et al., 2003; 
Hymel et al., 2005). However, a significant aspect of his theory that has remained largely 
neglected in the literature regards the power that moral engagement may have in 
thwarting others’ efforts to inflict harm. In fact, children who are morally engaged have 
been found to be more prosocial (Bandura et al., 1996). Along these lines, a handful of 
studies have highlighted ways in which moral engagement can bring out “the best” in 
children during bullying situations, as exemplified through greater defending. For 
instance, Gini, Pozzoli, and Hauser (2011) investigated moral competence and moral 
disengagement (reversed in order to be used as a measure of moral compassion) in peer-
reported bullies and defenders, finding that bullies were comparable to defenders in terms 
8 
 
of knowing “right” from “wrong,” but that they showed greater deficits in moral 
compassion. 
Patterns involving passive bystanders have not been as clear. The theoretical 
expectation is that moral disengagement would be higher in passive bystanders than in 
defenders. Bandura and colleagues (1996) argue that if moral principles are disengaged 
from harmful conduct, not only does motivation for aggressive behaviour increase, but so 
may the tendency to remain a passive witness who is not troubled with feelings of guilt 
for not helping. In other words, moral disengagement is thought to diminish the perceived 
“inhumanity” of aggressive behaviour (Hymel et al., 2005). Importantly, moral 
disengagement may add to inhibitory processes that are inherent to bullying bystander 
situations given the frequent presence of multiple witnesses (i.e., the bystander effect: 
Latané & Nida, 1981, Darley & Latané, 1968; Staub, 1970). In other words, prosociality 
in bullying bystanders may be suppressed due to social psychological processes related to 
the mere presence of multiple witnesses, but also due to their tendency to rationalize their 
own anticipated lack of prosociality. For example, a child witnessing a peer being 
harassed while in the presence of a crowd of children may stand by and simply watch 
because they interpret the inaction of others as a sign that there is no real need to 
intervene (i.e., ‘audience inhibition’ as described by Latané & Nida, 1981). If the 
bystander also thinks that the victim is annoying and not really his or her friend (i.e., 
‘dehumanzing’ as described by Bandura, 1999), he or she may be even less inclined to 
help or investigate whether or not help is needed. In turn, this greater bystander passivity 
may predict increased moral disengagement as expected by the bidirectional association 
between moral thought and action outlined in Bandura’s (1999) theory.  
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While defenders are expected to remain morally engaged because their behaviour 
matches moral standards, passive bystanders may need to morally disengage in order to 
distance themselves emotionally from the fact that they remain passive in the face of 
another person’s distress. This line of thinking speaks to very basic processes of emotion 
contagion in that self-focused personal distress may arise from (over)empathizing with 
another’s suffering and ultimately inhibiting prosocial tendencies. In contrast, when not 
flooded by emotions, sympathetic concern may arise and motivate prosocial behaviours, 
observed even in non-human primates (e.g., breaking up a fight or consoling a fellow ape 
who has been aggressed by a more powerful group member; de Waal, 2008).  
Similarly, studies of bystander responses to larger scale violence have suggested 
that internal conflict can arise when one remains a morally engaged, empathetic, yet 
passive witness to a victim in distress (Staub, 2000). Aside from this guilt-based moral 
disengagement, fear may also morally disengage bullying bystanders. For instance, 
bystanders who do end up intervening may have had to overcome the fear of 
embarrassing themselves in the presence of a peer audience (e.g., fear of social blunders; 
Hogg & Vaughan, 2008), or the fear of becoming the next target or losing social status by 
opposing a potentially popular bully (e.g., Mayeux & Cillessen, 2008). As such, moral 
disengagement provides an arguably adaptive coping strategy to minimize personal 
distress, be it guilt- or fear-based, in those who “mind their own business” when 
witnessing a peer being harassed. Importantly, this inhibition of moral concern may 
suppress altruistic motives (Bandura, 1999). As bystanders’ moral disengagement feeds 
into and is fed by behavioural distancing, greater tolerance for witnessing bullying may 
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develop through the effects of graduated exposure or systematic desensitization (Wolpe, 
1961). 
Despite these theoretical arguments, the scant literature examining moral 
disengagement in passive bystanders has not been conclusive. Much of the research in 
this area has used peer nominations to establish participant roles in bullying, an approach 
which categorizes the more passive bystanders into the “outsider” role (Salmivalli et al., 
1996). Menesini and colleagues (2003) found that in a sample of Italian and Spanish 
youth, peer-reported passive bystanders who were low on defending/intervention, were 
less morally disengaged than bullies indicating that moral disengagement may be more 
important for those who are aggressive toward peers than for those who remained passive 
in the presence of such aggression. While informative, moral disengagement strategies 
among those who remain passive versus those who intervene to help were not compared. 
Gini (2006) provided a more direct comparison between defenders and passive 
bystanders, finding similarities between these groups of children when identified using 
peer-report measures: 1) the higher children’s score as a passive bystander, the higher 
their score as a defender, and 2) higher scores on both the passive bystander and defender 
scales were related to lower levels of moral disengagement. Similarities between peer-
reported defenders and passive bystanders have also been found in terms of empathic 
responsiveness, although it appears that they differ on other measures such as social self-
efficacy (Gini, Albiero, Benelli, and Altoè, 2008). Based on the findings reviewed and 
contrary to the expectations of the socio-cognitive theory of moral agency (Bandura, 
1999), their seems to be greater similarity than differences between passive bystanders 
and defenders in terms of moral disengagement strategies. 
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Self- versus Peer-Report 
The parallels found between defenders and passive bystanders using peer reports 
are challenged by findings using self-reports. Pozzoli and Gini (2010) found a negative, 
rather than a positive association between active defending and passive bystanding using 
self-report data indicating that children who perceive themselves as passive bystanders 
are less likely to perceive themselves as defenders. Also, higher levels of passive 
bystanding were related to a lower personal sense of responsibility to intervene, a 
construct that is analogous to moral agency. Obermann (2011) also used self-report 
measures in a study of moral disengagement among different types of self-reported 
bystanders in a large Danish sample of early adolescents, finding that those who endorsed 
a sense of guilt about remaining passive also reported lower levels of moral 
disengagement than those who seemed to be unconcerned. Interestingly, these “guilty 
bystanders” showed similarly low levels of moral disengagement as defenders. These 
findings are consistent with theory in that bystanders who distance themselves morally 
from aggressive acts are expected to be protected from feelings of self-censure (Bandura, 
1999). The mixed findings to date regarding passive bystander behaviours using different 
informants may involve methodological issues similar to those identified for other 
bullying behaviours. For example, Juvonen, Nishina, and Graham (2001) highlight the 
low to moderate association between peer-reported and self-reported victimization across 
multiple studies, and emphasize that self-report and peer perception data are 
complementary given that they represent distinct constructs. Even though no clear 
guidelines are offered in terms of how best to integrate the data provided, multiple frames 
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of reference should be consulted given that these may provide important, albeit distinct 
perspectives on behaviour. 
Longitudinal Associations 
While the previously cited studies have been instrumental in establishing a link 
between moral disengagement and bystander behaviour, they are limited by the 
concurrent or cross-sectional sampling of behaviour, making it impossible to draw 
conclusions about directionality. Longitudinal investigations in this area of research are 
scarce and have to date focused principally on associations between moral disengagement 
and aggressive behaviour. For example, Paciello and colleagues (2008) provided 
convincing support for the impact of moral disengagement on moral conduct. These 
investigators tracked adolescents from ages 14 to 20, identifying several developmental 
trajectories of moral disengagement. A “chronic group” of children who remained 
moderate to highly morally disengaged were most likely to display frequent aggressive 
and violent behaviours in late adolescence as compared to the children developing along 
the following three trajectories: a non-disengaged group that maintained low levels of 
moral disengagement throughout their youth, a normative group with initially moderate 
levels that later declined, and a later desister group with levels that increased up to 16 
years of age and then sharply decreased. Moral disengagement has also been found to 
mediate the association between childhood risk factors (e.g., early rejecting parenting, 
neighborhood impoverishment) and antisocial behaviour later during adolescence (Hyde, 
Shaw, & Moilanen, 2010). In contrast, one study examining whether moral 
disengagement predicted defending behaviour later in the school year among a large 
sample of Australian youth found that empathy and collective efficacy, rather than moral 
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cognitions explained variance in subsequent defending (Barchia & Bussey, 2011b). In 
these longitudinal studies, moral disengagement was modeled as a predictor of behaviour 
as opposed to an outcome. While the direction of effect from cognition to behaviour may 
be the case for initial behaviour onset, the argument for such a unidirectional effect is less 
convincing in understanding the maintenance of behaviour. Indeed, a gradual and 
reciprocal interplay between moral disengagement and moral action is a central tenet of 
the theory of moral agency (Bandura, 1999), but one that has not been adequately tested 
to date. 
Objectives and Hypotheses 
This is a budding area of research that is in need of greater clarity regarding the 
associations between bystander’s moral cognitions and defending versus passive 
bystander behaviours. The current study attempted to meet this need by employing an 
intensive three-wave longitudinal design that assessed a diverse sample of Canadian older 
school-aged children over a four month period. The central goal was to address the 
following two questions: (1) How do the associations between bystander’s moral 
disengagement and defending versus passive bystander behaviour change over time, and 
(2) how do these patterns vary depending on the informant (self versus peers)?  
Based on the previous review suggesting that moral disengagement is an 
unnecessary cognitive strategy for those who are morally agentive (e.g., defenders), a 
negative relationship was expected between moral disengagement and defending such 
that defending would be most likely in those who are most engaged and least likely in 
those who are most disengaged, regardless of the informant. In contrast, the theoretical 
expectation of a positive association between moral disengagement and passive 
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bystanding was only applied to self-reported bystanding; the opposite pattern was 
expected using peer-report. Hypotheses regarding the over-time directionality of these 
associations are difficult to formulate given the lack of research in this area. Based on the 
postulates of the socio-cognitive theory of moral agency, reciprocal effects were expected 
between moral cognitions and behaviours (Bandura, 1999). It was expected that a three-
wave study would allow for the detection of such an interplay between moral 
disengagement and behaviour over time.  
Method 
Participants 
The sample consisted of 130 boys (n = 68) and girls (n = 62) attending fourth, 
fifth and sixth grade in two public schools in a Canadian city. The average age of 
participants was 11.36 years (SD = .69; range: 9.47 – 13.61 years; no mean differences in 
age between boys and girls). The majority of participants (93%) and their parents (>70%) 
were born in Canada. Most children reported speaking English at home (66%), while the 
remainder spoke French (19%) or other languages (13%).  Participants stated their 
ethnicity or cultural group in open ended fashion, resulting in a diverse response set: 
Canadian (37%), Christian (18%), Canadian and other (9%), French Canadian (7%), 
European (7%), Chinese (5%), Muslim (5%), Arab (5%), Caribbean (4%), Indian (2%), 
and Latino (2%). Parents reported on socioeconomic status (SES) using the MacArthur 
Scale of subjective SES (e.g., Adler, Epel, Castellazzo, & Ickovics, 2000), a “staircase” 
rating system with 10 steps representing lower to higher levels of SES. The median SES 
reported by parents was 6 (SD = 1.44; range 2 – 8). Household incomes ranged widely 
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from less than $15,000 to more than $100,000 per year and parents’ education ranged 
from less than a high school diploma to a doctorate degree.  
Procedure 
The study’s procedure involved obtaining approval from the local school boards, 
school principals, and governing boards. Students were recruited by sending out 
permission letters to their parents (see Appendix A). Students’ assent was also obtained 
(Appendix B). Prior to testing, participants were reminded that their responses would be 
kept confidential and that they could withdraw from the study at any time. Also, this 
study was approved by Concordia University’s Human Research Ethics Committee. 
Prior to data collection, participants were given a definition of bullying specifying 
that it involves acts that are intended to harm, that are repeated over time, that present a 
power imbalance, and that may take on different forms of aggression (e.g., verbal, 
relational, physical). Children were assessed at three times across a four-month period 
from late January to early June 2012 with 7-8 weeks between each wave. Twelve 
children (9% of original sample) were not present during the final data collection due to 
various reasons (e.g., illness, out of town). There were no differences in gender or age 
between the group of absent children and those who were present during the third time 
point. Missing data were handled using multiple imputation (as explained in the Results 
section). No data was missing when a child was present (i.e., all survey items were 
completed when a child was present). Self-report and peer-report measures were 
administered within classrooms using netbook computers with questionnaires 
programmed using Inquisit 3.0 (Seattle, WA:  Millisecond Software). Computerized 
assessments have been found to present a number of methodological advantages over 
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traditional paper and pencil methods (Van den Berg & Cillessen, 2013). Participants 
received school supplies and a t-shirt as remuneration. 
Measures 
Moral Disengagement. Moral disengagement was assessed using an abridged 
version of the 32-item Mechanisms of Moral Disengagement Scale (Bandura et al., 
1996). Participants were asked to rate their degree of agreement with 12 statements on a 
five-point Likert scale (1 = strongly disagree to 5 = strongly agree) representing four 
broad dimensions:  restructuring immoral behaviour (3 items: “It is okay to insult a 
classmate because hitting him or her would be worse,” “Bullying is just a normal part of 
being a kid,” “To hit an annoying classmate is just teaching them 'a lesson'”), 
dehumanizing the victim (3 items: e.g., “Kids who get mistreated usually do something to 
deserve it,” “It’s okay to treat somebody badly if they hurt other kids,” “It’s okay to leave 
someone out if they are annoying”), obscuring personal responsibility (3 items: “Kids 
cannot be blamed for misbehaving if their friends pressured them to do it,” “A kid who 
suggests breaking rules should not be blamed if other kids go ahead and do it,” “It’s okay 
to not help someone being bullied if others aren’t helping”), and misrepresenting 
injurious consequences (3 items: “Teasing someone does not really hurt them,” “It is 
okay to tell small lies because they don't really do any harm,” “Saying bad things about 
others doesn’t hurt anyone”).  These 12 items were randomly assigned to one of three 
parcels (Little, Cunningham, Shahar, & Widaman, 2002) that would be used as the 
observed measures in latent variable models. Confirmatory analyses showed that these 
parcels were manifestations of a single factor (T1 omega = .82; T2 omega = .85; T3 
omega = .88). The present study used omega to test reliability as an alternative to 
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Chronbach’s alpha given the limitations of alpha that have been highlighted by many 
statisticians (Schmitt, 1996; Sijtsma, 2009), and the recent view that omega provides a 
more accurate estimate of reliability (Revelle & Zinbarg, 2009). 
Self-reported defending and passive bystanding. Self-reported defending and 
passive bystanding were based on the items used by Pozzoli and Gini (2010).  
Participants rated items on a five-point Likert scale (from 1 = never true to 5 = always 
true) for how often in the past month they had engaged in the stated behaviour. Self-
reported defending was assessed using 3 items: “I defend the classmates who are hit or 
pushed by others,” “If someone insults or threatens a classmate, I try to stop him or her,” 
and “I try to help or comfort classmates who are left out by the group.”  Self-reported 
passive bystanding was assessed using 3 items: “When a classmate is hit or pushed in a 
mean way, I stand back and I mind my own business,” “If a classmate is called nasty 
names I do nothing”, and “If I know that someone is being excluded from the group, I act 
as if nothing happened.” Confirmatory analyses showed that each of these two sets of 
measures fit a single factor model (for defending: T1 omega = .81; T2 omega = .83; T3 
omega = .84; for passive bystanding:  T1 omega = .78; T2 omega = .75; T3 omega =.72).  
Peer reported defending and passive bystanding. These constructs were also 
measured with peer assessments (Bukowski, Cillessen, & Velasquez, 2011). In our 
procedure, participants were given a list of the names of every participating classmate 
accompanied by a statement that described a form of functioning within the peer group. 
The participants were asked to indicate which of their peers fit each description.  A 
participant could choose as many peers as he/she wished for each item. Self-choices were 
not allowed. The number of nominations received by a participant from same-sex peers 
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for a particular item was used as the participant’s score on this item. Items based on the 
Participant Role Questionnaire (Salmivalli, et al., 1996) were used to measure aspects of 
defending and passive bystander status.  Defending was measured using 3 items (T1 
omega = .80; T2 omega = .77; T3 omega =.79): “Someone who comforts a student who 
has been bullied,” “Someone who tells others to stop bullying,” and “Someone who tries 
to make the others stop bullying.” Passive bystanding was measured using 2 items (T1 
omega = .79; T2 omega = .62; T3 omega =.77): “Someone who stays out of bullying 
situations,” “Someone who doesn’t take sides with anyone during bullying situations.” In 
order to reduce the bias in scores due to variations in class size, the number of 
nominations received by each child was adjusted with a procedure as described by 
Velasquez, Bukowski, and Saldarriaga (2013). These authors propose a regression-based 
procedure that adjusts nomination-based scores so that a child’s score is less impacted by 




Multiple imputation. One child was not present during the second data collection 
(< 1% of original sample) and twelve children (9% of original sample) were not present 
during the final data collection due to various reasons (e.g., illness, out of town). There 
were no missing data on individual questionnaire items when children were present for 
data collection. Missing data was handled using multiple imputation following the 
method outlined by Little, Howard, McConnell, and Stump (2011). Principal components 
analysis was used to compute five factor scores, which represented 44% of the variance 
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in the original dataset. These factor scores, along with sex, age, and classroom were used 
as anchor variables to impute missing scores using Amelia II software (Honaker, King, & 
Blackwell, 2012). Twenty separate imputed data sets were created, which were then used 
in the final analyses conducted in MPlus Version 6.0 (Muthén & Muthén, 2010; TYPE = 
IMPUTATION). 
Descriptive statistics and mean differences. Means and standard deviations are 
given in Table 1.1. Several analyses were carried out in IBM SPSS version 19 in order to 
determine whether there were any mean-level differences in the study variables as a 
function of sex, age, and time. For simplicity, observed variables were used in these 
preliminary analyses.  
Given that age is a continuous variable, multiple regression analyses were 
conducted by entering age and sex on a first step, and then their interaction on a second 
step. At T2, older children received fewer peer nominations of defending ( = -.21; p < 
.05) and passive bystanding (  = -.33;  p < .05). Significant Sex X Age effects were 
found at T1 for these measures, with older girls receiving the most nominations ( = .18 
for peer-reported defending and  = .30 for peer-reported passive bystanding; p < .05).  
Next, a series of Sex X Time repeated measures ANOVAs were conducted in 
order to identify any changes within subjects over time (T1 versus T2 versus T3) and 
between subjects (boys versus girls); results are given in Table 1.1. Mauchly’s Test of 
Sphericity was conducted and the sphericity assumption was not violated in any of the 
analyses. Follow-up analyses were performed using the Bonferroni correction in order to 
prevent inflation of type I error rates. An alpha level of .05 was used in all analyses and 
follow-up analyses. Several patterns emerged as quantified in Table 1.1. In general, peer-
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reported defending and passive bystanding followed a similar pattern over time and 
between sex: girls received more nominations than boys on both measures, and scores 
decreased from T1 to T2 then remained steady into T3 for the full sample. 
Self and peer-reported defending followed a similar pattern over time for boys, 
mainly characterized by a steady decrease. Girls self-reported an increase in defending at 
T2, then a sharp decrease into T3, while peer-reports indicated that girls decreased in 
defending from T1 to T2 then increased into T3 (as indicated by a significant Time X Sex 
interaction). Self-reported passive bystanding was highly stable, with analyses revealing 
no main or interactive effects of time and sex. Boys reported higher levels of moral 
disengagement than did girls, and no change over time was observed. 
Bivariate correlations between study variables are given in Table 1.2 for boys and 
girls separately. The following general patterns were observed. Self-reported defending 
was negatively related to self-reported passive bystanding, indicating that the higher one 
is on defending the lower the likelihood of passive bystanding (similar strength for boys 
and girls). In general, peer-reported defending was positively related to peer-reported 
passive bystanding, indicating that the more one has a reputation of being a defender, the 
greater the likelihood of also being perceived as a passive bystander. Self-reported 
bystanding was not related to peer-reported passive bystanding, emphasizing the 
importance of having retained both sources of information. There was a small overlap 
between self-reported defending and peer-reported defending among boys and girls, and 




With regard to associations between moral disengagement and behaviour, as 
expected, there was a consistently negative association between moral disengagement 
and defending, although strongest in girls’ self-reports. In contrast, moral disengagement 
was positively associated with self-reported passive bystanding, with similar strength in 
boys and girls. Finally, findings were mixed for peer-reported passive bystanding, 
demonstrating little overlap with moral disengagement; however, associations tended to 
be positive for girls (in line with self-report and theory) and negative for boys. 
  
Final Analyses: The Over-time Interplay Between Moral Disengagement and 
Bystander Behaviour 
A common set of sequenced procedures were used to evaluate four three-wave 
two variable longitudinal models in order to assess the reciprocal effects between peer 
experience and moral disengagement.  Each of these four latent variable models used a 
different measure of experience:  self-reported passive bystanding, peer-reported passive 
bystanding, self-reported defending, and peer-assessed defending. With each of the four 
latent variable models, MPlus (Muthén & Muthén, 2010) was used to assess an initial 
stability model which included two types of paths: auotoregressive paths were included to 
represent the association between each variable and its corresponding measure at the next 
time, and covariances were used to represent the within time association between the two 
variables. Four autoregressive paths were included (i.e., T1 to T2 and T2 to T3 for each 
of the two variables) in each model, and three covariances (i.e., one at each of the three 
times). Following the evaluation of the stability model, a second model was tested that 
included cross lagged paths between the measures of experience and the measures of 
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moral disengagement. Finally, a multigroups procedure was used to assess differences in 
the findings for boys and girls. Depending on the comparative goodness of fit of these 
models, as established using the Chi squared difference test, associations were reported 
for either the full sample or for boys and girls separately. Standardized coefficients are 
given in Figures 1.1 to 1.4 for the significant paths in the final models (p < .05, two-tailed 
test unless otherwise specified; one-tailed tests considered acceptable given that 
hypotheses regarding direction of association were specified a priori).  
Self-reported passive bystanding and moral disengagement. Although the 
initial stability model showed an adequate level of fit (χ2 (111) = 139.26, p < .05, CFI = .97, 
RMSEA < .05) the second model that included the cross lagged paths was observed to be 
significantly better (χ2 (109) = 122.26, p > .05, CFI = .99, RMSEA < .05, Δχ
2(2) = 17.00, p 
< .05).  
The model was then tested separately for boys and for girls in an unconstrained 
multiple group model (unconstrained because no hypotheses were made about how the 
associations might differ over time among boys versus among girls). This multiple group 
model was also a good fit to the data (χ2 (242) = 257.08, p > .05, CFI = .98, RMSEA < .05) 
and did not differ significantly from the full sample model (Δχ2 (133) = 134.83, p > .05). 
As a final comparison, the multiple group model was analyzed by constraining all paths 
to be equal for boys and for girls. The fit of this fully-constrained model was just as good 
as that of the full sample model and that of the unconstrained model, suggesting that 
patterns of association are similar for boys and girls (χ2 (270) = 301.94, p > .05, CFI = .97, 
RMSEA < .05; Δχ2 (161) = 179.98, p > .05). As illustrated in Figure 1.1, moral 
disengagement was highly stable over time. Passive bystanding became more stable from 
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T2 to T3 than it had been from T1 to T2, as determined by comparing the fit of the 
unconstrained model to one that fixed these two paths to be equal to one another (χ2 (110) = 
130.93, p > .05, CFI = .98, RMSEA < .05; Δχ2 (1) = 8.67, p < .05). As expected, all 
significant associations between moral disengagement and self-reported passive 
bystanding were in the positive direction indicating that a greater tendency to morally 
disengage is related to the subjective experience of remaining passive during bullying 
situations. This was evident in the positive concurrent association between moral 
disengagement and passive bystanding at T1 and at T3, which is in line with the bivariate 
correlations reported in Table 1.2. Beyond the significant autoregressive paths and 
covariances, several significant cross lagged paths were observed between moral 
disengagement and passive bystanding. Specifically, T1 moral disengagement was 
related to higher levels of passive bystanding at T2, which in turn predicted higher moral 
disengagement at T3.  
Peer-reported passive bystanding and moral disengagement. The peer-
assessed measures of passive bystanding were used next as the measure of experience.  
Although the initial stability model again showed a good fit to the data  (χ2 (75) = 78.79, p 
> .05, CFI = .99, RMSEA < .05) the second model was observed to be significantly better 
(χ2 (71) = 66.71, p > .05, CFI = 1.00, RMSEA < .05, Δχ
2 (4) = 12.08, p < .05)  When the 
model was then tested separately for boys and for girls, the unconstrained multiple group 
model also showed a good fit to the data (χ2 (164) = 150.23, p > .05, CFI = 1.00, RMSEA < 
.05) and was not significantly different from the full sample model (Δχ2 (92) = 86.23, p > 
.05).  However, a multiple group model that constrained boys and girls to be equal on all 
paths resulted in a poorer fit to the data than the unconstrained model (χ2 (172) = 177.10, p 
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< .05, CFI = .99, RMSEA < .05; Δχ2 (8) =26.87, p < .05), suggesting sex differences in 
patterns of associations.  
In order to identify the paths on which sex differences occurred, a series of 
models that individually constrained each path in the model to be equal for boys and for 
girls was compared to the unconstrained model using the Chi squared difference test. 
There were sex differences on the following paths (Chi squared difference test results are 
given comparing the fit of a model that constrained the path to be equal for boys and for 
girls to the fit of the unconstrained multigroups model):   T2 passive bystanding on T1 
passive bystanding (Δχ2 (1) = 9.87, p < .05); T2 passive bystanding on T1 moral 
disengagement (Δχ2 (1) = 3.97, p < .05); T3 passive bystanding on T2 passive bystanding 
(Δχ2  (1) = 4.21, p < .05); T2 moral disengagement on T1 passive bystanding (Δχ
2 
(1) = 
3.30, p < .10); T3 moral disengagement on T2 moral disengagement (Δχ2 (1) = 7.75, p < 
.05); T3 moral disengagement on T2 passive bystanding (Δχ2 (1) = 3.90, p < .05); T1 
moral disengagement with T1 passive bystanding (Δχ2 (1) = 4.29, p < .05). Standardized 
coefficients for all significant paths are displayed in Figure 1.2 and paths that differed for 
boys and for girls are noted.  
Stability of moral cognitions and behaviour over time was also compared for boys 
and for girls. This was done by constraining the T1 to T2 paths to be equal to the T2 to 
T3 paths for each measure, separately for boys and for girls. The fit of these models were 
then compared to the fit of the unconstrained multiple groups model using the Chi 
squared difference test. These comparisons revealed that girls’ reputation as passive 
bystanders became more stable over time (if paths constrained, χ2 (165) = 156.15, p > .05, 
CFI = 1.00, RMSEA < .05; Δχ2 (1) =5.92, p < .05, therefore worse fit than that of the 
25 
 
unconstrained model). Boys’ reputation tended to become less stable over time (if paths 
constrained, χ2 (165) = 153.04, p > .05, CFI = 1.00, RMSEA < .05; Δχ
2 
(1) =2.81, p < .10, 
therefore trend-level worse fit than that of the unconstrained model). Next, girls’ moral 
cognitions tended to become more stable (if paths constrained, χ2 (165) = 153.06, p > .05, 
CFI = 1.00, RMSEA < .05; Δχ2 (1) =2.83, p < .10, therefore trend-level worse fit than that 
of the unconstrained model), while boys’ moral cognitions tended to become less stable 
(if paths constrained, χ2 (165) = 153.02, p > .05, CFI = 1.00, RMSEA < .05; Δχ
2 
(1) =2.79, p 
< .10, therefore trend worse than unconstrained model). Also for boys, passive 
bystanding and moral disengagement at T2 were equally strong in their influence on 
Time 3 moral disengagement. Importantly, the general direction of association between 
moral disengagement and peer-reported passive bystanding was negative for boys (i.e., 
concurrent association at T1, and predictive from T2 passive bystanding to T3 moral 
disengagement) and positive for girls (i.e., bidirectional associations between T1 and T2 
moral disengagement and passive bystanding). That is, moral disengagement tended to be 
related to less passivity in boys versus more passivity in girls according to peer report.  
Self-reported defending and moral disengagement. In the next analysis, the 
self-report measure of defending behaviour was used as the measure of experience. 
Again, the initial stability model was observed to have a moderate fit (χ2 (110) = 157.95, p 
< .05, CFI = .96, RMSEA > .05).  Adding the cross lagged paths to the model improved 
the model fit significantly (χ2 (106) = 125.79, p > .05, CFI = .99, RMSEA < .05, Δχ
2 (4) = 
32.16, p < .05).  When the model was then tested for boys and girls separately, the 
unconstrained multiple group model also showed a good fit to the data (χ2 (236) = 243.64, p 
> .05, CFI = .99, RMSEA < .05) and did not differ significantly from the full sample 
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model (Δχ2 (130) = 117.85, p > .05). However, a multiple group model that constrained 
boys and girls to be equal on all paths resulted in a poorer fit to the data than the 
unconstrained model (χ2 (267) = 495.74, p > .05, CFI = .81, RMSEA > .05; Δχ
2 
(31) = 
252.10, p < .05), suggesting sex differences in patterns of associations.  
In order to identify the paths on which sex differences occurred, a series of 
models that individually constrained each path in the model to be equal for boys and for 
girls was compared to the unconstrained model using the Chi squared difference test. 
There were sex differences on the following paths (Chi squared difference test results 
given comparing the unconstrained multigroups model to the  fit of a model that 
constrained the path to be equal for boys and for girls to the fit of): T3 defending on T2 
defending (Δχ2 (1) = 4.91, p < .03); T3 defending on T2 moral disengagement (Δχ
2 
(1) = 
4.93, p < 0.05); T2 moral disengagement on T1 defending (Δχ2 (1) = 2.73, p < .10); T2 
moral disengagement on T2 defending (Δχ2 (1) = 3.96, p < .05).  
Stability of moral cognitions and behaviour over time was also compared for boys 
and for girls. This was done by constraining the T1 to T2 paths to be equal to the T2 to 
T3 paths for each measure, separately for boys and for girls, and then comparing the fit of 
each of these models to that of the unconstrained multiple groups model using the Chi 
squared difference test. These comparisons revealed that girls’ moral disengagement 
tended to become more stable over time (if paths constrained, χ2 (237) = 246.40, p > .05, 
CFI = .99, RMSEA < .05; Δχ2 (1) = 2.76, p < .10, therefore trend-level worse fit than the 
fit of the unconstrained model). Standardized coefficients for all significant paths are 
displayed in Figure 1.3 and paths that differed for boys and for girls are noted.  
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As shown in Figure 1.3, the pattern of association between moral disengagement 
and self-reported defending was negative as expected, except for one path for boys (path 
from T1 defending to T2 moral disengagement). For boys, there was a bidirectional 
association between defending and moral disengagement from T1 to T2, after which 
point only defending predicted later decreases in moral disengagement. For girls, moral 
disengagement was predictive of subsequent decreases in defending while defending did 
not predict subsequent changes in moral disengagement.      
Peer-reported defending and moral disengagement. In the final analysis peer 
reported defending behaviour was used as the measure of experience. Again the initial 
stability model showed a good fit to the data (χ2 (113) = 143.95, p < .05, CFI = .96, 
RMSEA < .05) but the second model was again observed to be significantly better (χ2 (109) 
= 124.34, p > .05, CFI = .99, RMSEA < .05, Δχ2 (4) = 19.61, p < .05). The unconstrained 
multiple group model (boys and girls) had a poorer fit to the data (χ2 (242) = 358.06, p < 
.05, CFI = .90, RMSEA > .05) and was significantly different from the full sample model 
(Δχ2 (133) = 233.72, p < .05). Results are therefore given for the full sample, presumed to 
be equally valid for boys and for girls. As illustrated in Figure 1.4, having a reputation as 
a defender at T3 was best predicted by T1 defending and T2 defending, with a strong 
association observed between T1 and T2 defending. A similar autoregressive pattern was 
observed for moral disengagement. Next, while moral disengagement was related to 
lower levels of peer-reported defending at T1, the only significant cross-lagged path 





The current study examined the over-time associations between moral cognitions 
and defending versus passive bystanding during bullying situations. The global pattern 
that emerged provides partial support for a bidirectional relation between moral thought 
and action. Findings are therefore in line with the socio-cognitive theory of moral agency,  
which considers moral disengagement to be a self-regulatory strategy that is only 
recruited when conduct is at odds with presumed moral standards (Bandura, 1999). 
Results are summarized below within a discussion of methodological issues and gender 
effects that may account for some deviations from theory. Avenues for future research are 
also proposed. 
Self-Reported Passive Bystanding and Moral Disengagement 
As expected, there was a consistent pattern of positive associations between moral 
disengagement and self-reported passive bystanding, concurrently and over time. 
Specifically, variance in passive bystanding at the mid-point of the study was accounted 
for not only by whether children were passive to start off with, but also by their initial 
level of moral disengagement, with higher moral disengagement at T1 predicting greater 
passive bystanding at T2. In turn, increased passive bystanding at the mid-point predicted 
subsequent increased moral disengagement at T3. It is also noteworthy that passive 
bystanding became more stable over time as evidenced through the stronger path 
coefficients between the last two time points versus the first two time points. This 
increased stability may have been influenced by greater consonance between thoughts 
and actions over time. Therefore, the tendency of passive bystanders to rationalize 
aggressive behaviour as morally acceptable does seem to inhibit prosocial behaviour, and 
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this process appears to then feed into further such rationalizations. These findings support 
the possibility that moral disengagement serves as a coping function for those who 
witness disturbing bullying incidents yet do nothing to help the victims (Staub, 2000). 
That being said, studies that directly assess adjustment in bystanders who disengage 
versus those who remain engaged would offer a more thorough test of this theory. 
Peer-Reported Passive Bystanding and Moral Disengagement 
The interplay between moral disengagement and peer-reported passive bystander 
behaviour as operationalized using items from the “outsider” participant role scale 
(Salmivalli et al., 1996) differed from the patterns seen using self-reported passive 
bystanding. Based on both correlational findings and path analyses, an inconsistent set of 
associations was found over time between being seen as a passive bystander and moral 
disengagement. In the case of boys, if paths were significant, a pattern of negative 
associations emerged between passive bystanding behaviour and moral disengagement 
such that boys who are perceived to be passive bystanders are less likely to report high 
levels of moral disengagement; this negative association is in line with previous studies 
that have used a concurrent design (e.g., Gini, 2006).  In contrast, the associations for 
girls, if significant, were in the positive direction, indicating that girls who are perceived 
to be passive during bullying situations are more likely to report greater moral 
disengagement. This positive association is consistent with the pattern observed using 
self-reported passive bystanding scores, and with the theoretical expectation that passive 
bystanders use moral disengagement strategies. Boys and girls also differed in how stable 
their peer-reported bystander behaviour was perceived to be. Boys’ reputation as passive 
bystanders endured during the four-month period of this study, whereas girls’ reputation 
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only became stable after the mid-point. Also for boys, passive bystanding at the mid-
point predicted just as much variance in moral disengagement as did earlier levels of 
moral disengagement, and may have accounted for the decreased stability in boys’ moral 
cognitions. Nonetheless, it seems as though reporting higher moral disengagement does 
not hold much weight in explaining whether peers view boys as passive bystanders. 
Girls showed quite a different pattern, manifested by positive bidirectional 
associations between self-reported moral disengagement and peer-reported bystander 
behaviour up until the mid-point. Although there were no further direct influences, one 
cannot neglect the indirect influence that previous moral disengagement had in 
contributing to the near perfect stability of girls’ reputation as a passive bystander into the 
final time point. Similarly, there was an indirect influence of peer-reported passive 
bystander behaviour on the near perfect stability of self-reported moral disengagement 
into the final time point. Thus, girls’ early thoughts and passive bystanding behaviours 
exerted an influence on one another that set them on a more stable path. Perhaps with an 
additional time point, we may have detected continued reciprocal associations between 
moral disengagement and passive bystanding in girls. Overall, there is support for 
cognitive self-regulation in girls’ passive bystanding behaviour.  
But why did the expected pattern not emerge for boys? Differences in gender 
roles may offer a possible explanation (e.g., Maccoby & Jacklin, 1987), with gender 
stereotypes heightening expectations for prosociality in girls. Those girls who others 
detect as “staying out of bullying situations” have likely deviated the most from a 
“gentle-caring girl morality” (Thornberg, 2010), and may therefore be most in need of 
moral disengagement to cope with their “immoral” lack of intervention. In contrast, boys 
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who have the reputation of being a passive bystander may not be held to the same 
standard of “moral” conduct. While speculative, it may be the case that being a passive 
bystander is considered to be somewhat prosocial among boys, as supported by the 
consistently negative correlations between moral disengagement and passive bystanding 
in boys. Indeed, those boys who are perceived to stay out of bullying situations do not 
seem to need to legitimize aggressive behaviour in order to cope with their passivity. In 
contrast, boys who claim to be more passive using self-report do report higher moral 
disengagement (similar to girls). The divergence of self- and peer-reported passive 
bystanding may be explained by the possibility that those who report passive bystanding 
are somehow admitting to knowledge that the target of harassment is being harmed. 
Explicit knowledge of harm, by definition, makes the passive bystander behaviour fall 
within the realm of morality, thus amplifying the potential need for cognitive strategies to 
rationalize one’s passivity in the face of another’s suffering (Staub, 2000).  
Self-Reported Defending and Moral Disengagement 
An unexpectedly different pattern emerged for boys and girls using self-reported 
defending. Findings for girls were in line with the expectation that those higher on 
defending would be less likely to morally disengage, although the reverse direction was 
not supported. Rather, moral disengagement showed increasing stability over time in 
girls, independent of how much of a defender a girl reported to be. In contrast, girls were 
not as stable in their self-reports of defending, with additional variance in their defending 
behaviour being explained by previous levels of moral disengagement. In other words, 
moral cognitions, which tended to become progressively more rigid, were found to 
motivate defending behaviour in girls over time. Surprisingly, this behaviour change did 
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not feed back into shaping cognitions, perhaps due to increased cognitive rigidity. 
Bidirectional associations may better be captured in girls over a longer-term study that 
includes an earlier time point and a later time point to better capture the period of early 
adolescence. 
The pattern of findings for boys was inconsistent and difficult to interpret. On the 
one hand, higher moral disengagement at the outset predicted lower self-reported 
defending at the mid-point, which in turn predicted higher moral disengagement at the 
final time point. In other words, there was evidence for the existence of a self-regulatory 
mechanism that ensures a match between boys’ moral reasoning and agentive behaviour, 
and that this develops gradually over time  (as per Bandura, 1999). On the other hand, 
and contrary to expectation, initial defending predicted increased moral disengagement at 
the mid-point for boys, suggesting a mismatch between thoughts and actions. 
Nonetheless, this counterintuitive effect did not spill over into the final time point. 
Indeed, nearly all of the variance in defending behaviour at the final time point was 
explained by previously reported defending, which had been shaped by greater initial 
moral engagement.  
In any case, one cannot avoid speculating about the inconsistent finding: why do 
some boys who report to be defenders subsequently legitimize harmful behaviour? It may 
be the case that this finding has captured a subgroup of boys who engage in “antisocial” 
forms of defending (Rubinstein, 2005). Perhaps the greater frequency of overt forms of 
bullying observed among boys motivates “good” boys to behave a little “badly,” perhaps 
toward bullies in particular, in order to defend a victim in need. As such, cognitive 
strategies to come to terms with the dissonance between thoughts and actions may be 
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required. The merits of this interpretation should be verified by exploring the moderating 
effect of aggression on the association between moral disengagement and defending (e.g., 
Barchia & Bussey, 2011b). This effect seems to disappear over time, in parallel to 
decreasing mean levels of defending among boys. With evidence that levels of 
victimization decrease across the school year (Saldarriaga, 2011), there may be a reduced 
need to defend victims later in the school year. Perhaps with time, social roles and social 
hierarchy stabilize, and victimization (including being aggressive toward a bully in 
defense of a victim) may no longer be needed as a control strategy to ensure that the peer 
group attains its goals of cohesion and homogeneity (Bukowski & Sippola, 2001).   
Peer-Reported Defending and Moral Disengagement 
Despite the importance of using self-reported defending in order to identify 
children who may not be as public in their defense of victims as some other children, 
using a single informant to report on thoughts and behaviours may inflate effect sizes due 
to shared method variance. As such, the interplay between moral disengagement and 
defending was also tested using peer-reported behaviours. Although peer-reports are also 
subject to certain biases (e.g., reputation that persists beyond behaviour change), peer-
reported defending was used to reduce biases due to shared method variance, as well as to 
reduce some of the biases inherent in self-report measures (e.g., social desirability 
responding). As expected, associations between moral disengagement and peer-reported 
defending, if significant, were negative both concurrently and over time. However, not all 
paths in the three timepoint panel model were significantly associated. This may be due 
to the use of cross-informants, as evidenced by the associations between peer-reported 
defending behaviour over time; although a negative association was found between moral 
34 
 
disengagement and defending initially, much of the variance in defending at the final 
time point was explained by initial defending, which contributed to final defending both 
directly and indirectly through defending at the mid-point. The fact that this “reputation 
effect” was not found to be as strong for peer-reported passive bystanding  may be due to 
the greater difficulty for the peer group to consistently report lack of behaviour, as in the 
case of identifying passive bystanders, compared to reporting on overt behaviours, as in 
the case of identifying defenders. 
Notwithstanding the stability of peer-reported defending, children that the peer 
group initially identified as highest on defending reported lower concurrent levels of 
moral disengagement, as found in previous studies (e.g., Gini, 2006). In turn, initial low 
moral disengagement predicted higher subsequent defending. This pattern is in line with 
the socio-cognitive theory of moral agency as well as with previous findings showing that 
children whose moral principles do not waver depending on situational factors are more 
prone to engage in prosocial behaviour (Bandura et al., 1996). Nonetheless, the pattern of 
change in moral disengagement in a model containing peer-reported defending did not 
fully support the idea of an interplay between thoughts and behaviour. Perhaps longer 
stretches of time are needed to capture the gradual change postulated in the theory, 
particularly when behaviour is assessed by others who may not detect minor, yet 
potentially significant behavioural change. Indeed, aside from the impact that defending 
may have had on initial moral disengagement, changes over time in moral disengagement 
were mostly driven by the cognitive strategies that children started out with, as indicated 
by the direct and indirect links between initial and final levels of moral disengagement.   
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Taken together, the findings of the current study provide partial support for the 
socio-cognitive theory of moral agency (Bandura, 1999) in that greater moral engagement 
explains some variance in subsequent defending behaviour, and that those who 
rationalize immoral conduct as somehow acceptable display a pattern of passivity when 
faced with bullying situations. This general pattern was observed over time, across 
informants, and between sexes. The only outright contradiction to the theory occurred for 
boys, who, for part of the study displayed increasing moral disengagement as a function 
of higher levels of self-reported defending. The following future directions are suggested 
in order to build upon the current findings and to offer recommendations for the 
optimization of programs aimed at recruiting passive bystanders to intervene in defense 
of their victimized peers. 
Future Directions 
How to achieve more consistent results? a) Peer-reports of passive bystander 
behaviour. The findings of this study suggest that the negative concurrent association 
between passive bystander behaviour and moral disengagement reported in previous 
studies may be masking both over-time associations and gender effects. The matching 
pattern of associations using self- and peer-reported bystanding in girls adds credibility to 
a theory of cognitive self-regulation of moral behaviour. Indeed, the morality of being a 
passive bystander who does nothing to help a victimized peer is explicit in the self-report 
measures and appears to be implicit for girls who are nominated as passive bystanders. 
Understanding why this pattern did not occur for boys is a worthwhile avenue for future 
research. This may be achieved by developing peer-report measures that explicitly outline 
a nominated bystander’s knowledge of harm to the victim. With the greater specificity 
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afforded by such a measure regarding the “immorality” of passive bystanding, it is 
expected that nominated boys may show a similar pattern to the one observed in 
nominated girls and via self-report, thus lending further support to theory. b) Control for 
levels of aggression. The counterintuitive finding regarding greater moral disengagement 
in higher defending boys raises the question of how aggressive those boys were to begin 
with. As such, level of aggression should be controlled for in future studies (e.g., Barchia 
& Bussey, 2011b). 
Is moral disengagement adaptive for bystanders?Another worthwhile direction 
to explore is to test the assumption that moral disengagement is somehow adaptive for 
passive bystanders, as suggested by theory and implied by previous research (e.g., 
Obermann, 2011). A study that assesses the moderating effect of moral disengagement on 
bystanders’ levels of adjustment over time (e.g., sense of guilt, self-esteem) would lend 
further validity to this claim. If self-worth is indeed enhanced or worsened as a function 
of moral-cognitive self-regulation (Hymel et al., 2005), then bystanders who remain 
morally engaged should report greater levels of self-condemnation. 
How to better capture change over time? Longer-term longitudinal studies may 
better capture changes in moral disengagement over time given the assumption that such 
changes occur due to a gradual pattern of reciprocal feedback between thoughts and 
behaviours. On the flip side, it may be the case that more transient changes in moral 
disengagement may be best captured during the immediate time frame surrounding a 
morally challenging incident. That is, moral disengagement may reach a temporary peak 
at this early stage of cognitive challenge and then decrease to a steadier pattern best 
observed in the longer-term. It is recommended therefore to design studies that can test 
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more immediate and shorter term changes in order to fully appreciate the influence of the 
mechanisms of moral disengagement. This may be achieved through the use of daily 
diary tools or multiple daily assessments using handheld mobile devices over the course 
of several days. Experimental manipulation in a laboratory setting may also tap into more 
immediate changes in disengagement mechanisms, thus uncovering changes that were 
not perceptible within the present study’s design.  Also, applying a burst design with 
multiple assessments within multiple time points over a longer period is ideally suited to 
tracking short-term and long term change.  
Conclusions 
The current study provides rare insight into the longitudinal associations between 
moral disengagement and bystander behaviour during bullying incidents. Assessing a 
diverse community sample of Canadian early adolescents over three time points and with 
the use of multiple informants allowed for the identification of some important 
distinctions between passive bystanders and defenders. While several avenues for future 
research remain, there is support for targeting change in moral disengagement as a way to 
recruit passive bystanders to intervene in defense of victims, with the ultimate goal of 
curbing the incidence of school bullying. That being said, the association between moral 
disengagement and bystander behaviours was less than perfect suggesting the potential 
role of other predictors. The studies presented in the following two chapters test 
personality and friendship as predictors and potential moderators of the link between 




Table 1.1.  Descriptive statistics for the study variables for boys (n = 68) and for 
girls (n = 62).  
 
 Boys  Girls   
Variables M (SD)  M (SD)  Repeated Measures ANOVAsa 
T1 SR Defending 3.56 (1.00)  3.58 (.72)  Time : F (2, 256) = 14.73, p
2 = .10;  
           T1 = T2, T3 < T1, T2. 
Time x Sex: F (1, 128) = 4.07, p
2 = .03 
T2 SR Defending 3.43 (1.04)  3.68 (.77)  
T3 SR Defending 3.24 (1.07)  3.29 (.71)  
T1 SR Bystanding 2.37 (.80)  2.34 (.66)   
T2 SR Bystanding 2.33 (.88)  2.22 (.59)  
T3 SR Bystanding 2.22 (.79)  2.26 (.58)  
T1 PR Defending 1.81 (1.12  2.36 (1.37) * Time : F (2, 256) = 35.48,p
2 = .22;   
           T1 > T2, T3; T2 = T3. 
Sex: F (1, 128) = 453.45, p
2 = .13 
Time X Sex: F (2, 256) = 4.94, p
2 = .04 
T2 PR Defending 1.24 (.90)  1.76 (.96) * 
T3 PR Defending .95 (.86)  1.94 (1.06) * 
T1 PR Bystanding 1.54 (1.02)  2.60 (1.18) * Time : F (2, 256) = 28.16, p
2 = .18).  
           T1 > T2, T3 ; T2 = T3. 
Sex: F (1, 128) = 27.74, p
2 = .18 
Time X Sex: F (2, 256) = 17.67, p
2 = .12 
T2 PR Bystanding  1.45 (.99)  1.57 (1.17)  
T3 PR Bystanding .82 (.74)  1.97 (1.18) * 
T1 MD 2.20 (.58)  1.99 (.55) * Sex: F (1, 128) = 7.56, p
2 = .06 
 T2 MD 2.22 (.65)  1.98 (.55) * 
T3 MD 2.27 (.78)  1.94 (.59) * 
 
Notes: *Sex difference at the corresponding time point, PR: Peer-report, SR: Self-report, 
MD: Moral Disengagement. aSex and time effects (p < .05). 
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Table 1.2.  Pearson zero-order correlation coefficients for boys (below the diagonal) and for girls (above the diagonal) 
Notes: SR= Self-report; PR= Peer-report; **p <.01; *p <.05. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 
1. Age_years – .02 - .09 .06 .20 .17 - .08 .17 - .04 .03 .19 -.36** - .07 - .19 - .08 - .04 
2. T1 SR Defending .19 – .55** .53** -.39** - .24 -.30* .26* .18 .12 - .09 - .08 - .10 -.39** -.35** -.23* 
3. T2 SR Defending - .01 .67** – .63** -.43** -.61** -.32* .20 .13 .03 -.28* - .13 - .16 -.36** -.36** -.34** 
4. T3 SR Defending .11 .77** .77** – -.43** -.45** -.38** .35** .23 .11 - .08 - .20 - .21 -.41** -.44** -.40** 
5. T1 SR Passive Bystanding .03 -.45** -.47** -.47** – .53** .21 - .24 - .25 - .05 .02 .09 .13 .31* .27* .32* 
6. T2 SR Passive Bystanding .09 -.32** -.43** -.34** .33** – .39** - .22 - .15 .04 - .02 .15 .21 .36** .36** .46** 
7. T3 SR Passive Bystanding - .02 -.46** -.45** -.38** .38** .59** – - .20 - .09 - .12 - .02 .03 .07 .23 .40** .50** 
8. T1 PR Defending - .20 .11 .02 .11 - .09 .11 .08 – .62** .62** .33** - .14 - .09 -.42** -.30* -.36** 
9. T2 PR Defending -.36** .17 .15 .21 - .08 - .03 - .10 .67** – .54** .20 .31* .18 -.25* - .06 - .13 
10. T3 PR Defending - .09 .24* .18 .32** - .13 - .02 - .06 .61** .53** – .14 .05 .00 -.35** - .21 - .19 
11. T1 PR  Passive Bystanding -.52** -.28* - .11 - .20 - .02 .04 .01 .36** .41** .30* – .31* .33** - .01 .11 .08 
12. T2 PR  Passive Bystanding -.31** - .12 .02 - .12 - .05 .06 .03 .31* .30* .34** .65** – .58** .19 .24 .16 
13. T3 PR  Passive Bystanding - .15 - .06 - .02 - .04 .00 .02 - .02 .18 .02 .17 .52** .47** – .27* .19 .24 
14. T1 Moral disengagement - .02 - .22 -.41** -.34** .34** .32** .27* - .15 - .15 - .19 - .23 - .13 - .08 – .62** .59** 
15. T2 Moral disengagement .09 .04 - .16 - .11 .11 .20 .04 - .08 - .14 - .05 - .16 - .03 - .10 .51** – .82** 
16. T3 Moral disengagement - .01 - .13 -.45** -.36** .36** .28* .34** - .09 - .17 -.26* -.26* - .20 - .16 .67** .60** – 
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Figure 1.4.   Moral disengagement and self-reported defending over time. 
 
 




























Chapter 2: The Interactive Effect of Personality and Moral Disengagement in 
Predicting Bullying Bystander Behaviours 
There is growing interest among bullying researchers to understand factors that 
differentiate bystanders who come to the defense of victimized peers from those who do 
not. The principal rationale for this avenue of research is to guide peer-led interventions 
to curb school bullying, a fruitful endeavour considering research that has demonstrated 
the effectiveness of peer defenders. For instance, defending behaviour has been found to 
diffuse over half of bullying episodes in less than ten seconds (Craig & Pepler, 1997). 
Unfortunately the vast majority of children do not come to the aid of victims despite 
recognizing the harmful and unjust nature of bullying, as gauged through their frequently 
reported anti-bullying attitudes (e.g., Rigby & Johnson, 2006). There is much yet to be 
done to clarify the complexity of bystander behaviour, and any such attempt requires the 
consideration of multiple factors that must be examined in combination in order to 
identify potential interactive effects.  
The current study aimed to achieve this goal through a novel and multi-faceted 
conceptualization of bystander behaviour that draws from two theoretical frameworks: 
Bandura’s socio-cognitive theory of moral agency and Gray’s reinforcement sensitivity 
theory (Bandura, 1999; Gray, 1970, 1987; Gray & McNaugton, 2000). An investigation 
based on these two theories in combination was expected to reveal the interplay between 
morality and personality in explaining variance in bystander behaviour. In other words, 
bystanders were not only evaluated along a moral-immoral dimension, but also according 
to the potential influence of fundamental temperamental traits that may underlie their 
tendency to either intervene as defenders, to stand by as passive witnesses, or to 
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aggravate the problem as bully-reinforcers. The moral dimension, alone, was only 
expected to account for differences in prosocial versus aggressive behaviours (i.e., 
defending versus bully-reinforcing), while the personality dimension, alone, was only 
expected to account for differences in active versus passive behaviours (i.e., defending 
and bully-reinforcing versus passive bystanding). Furthermore, interactions between the 
moral and the personality factors were also considered as these would allow for more 
sensitive hypotheses to predict bystander behaviour based on a combination of differing 
degrees on both dimensions. For example, defending may be seen as an active and 
prosocial behaviour. 
The (Im)morality of Bystander Behaviour 
Bandura’s social cognitive theory of moral agency offers an explanation for 
deviations between moral principles and actual conduct (Bandura, 1999). The theory 
defines the construct of moral disengagement as a self-regulatory cognitive strategy in 
which acts that go against one’s moral code are legitimized, either in anticipation of 
committing these acts or after these acts have been committed in order to cope with the 
negative emotions (e.g., guilt) that result from doing what one usually believes to be 
wrong. According to the theory, moral disengagement inhibits prosocial behaviour and 
disinhibits aggression. Considering the disproportion between the majority of children 
who report anti-bullying attitudes and who state intentions to support hypothetical 
victimized peers versus the minority who actually take on the defender role (Rigby & 
Johnson, 2006), it may be the case that moral disengagement mediates the influence of 
one’s moral standards on one’s behaviour. While defenders should remain morally 
engaged due to the consonance between prosocial thoughts and defending behaviour, 
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passive bystanders may need to justify aggression as a way of dealing with their passivity 
in the face of a fellow peer being harassed. Bully-reinforcers would also be expected to 
rely on moral disengagement strategies given that they not only tolerate witnessing 
aggressive acts, but are motivated to encourage aggressors (e.g., by cheering). While 
moral disengagement has consistently been linked to bullying behaviour (e.g., Menesini 
et al., 2003; Hymel et al., 2005) and has distinguished bullies from defenders (e.g., Gini, 
2006), the question of whether passive bystanders or bully reinforcers are prone to moral 
disengagement has been largely overlooked to date.  
The Bystander Effect as a Reason for Passivity 
While moral disengagement may inhibit prosocial behaviour, prosocial behaviour 
during bullying situations may also be suppressed by socio-emotional processes related to 
the bystander effect. The bystander effect is a phenomenon described as the tendency to 
refrain from or to delay offering help when witnessing emergency situations when there 
are other bystanders present (reviewed by Darley & Latané, 1968; Latané & Nida, 1981; 
Latané & Darley, 1968; Staub, 1970). In other words, one’s response to another’s distress 
in such situations is thought to not only be a function of moral agency, but also a function 
of the perceived ambiguities and uncertainties that may arise from the mere presence of 
other witnesses. Given that multiple bystanders are typically present during bullying 
incidents – namely, incidents when someone is being harmed and in need of help – 
bullying bystanders may fall under the influence of the bystander effect.  
Drawing from the vast research on the bystander effect from the field of social 
psychology, several processes may hinder bystander intervention during bullying. For 
instance, children witnessing bullying may expect others to take action before they 
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themselves become likely to intervene (“diffusion of responsibility;” Latané & Darley, 
1970). Or, they may interpret the inaction of other bystanders as a sign that the 
interaction between the bully and the victim is not that serious (“pluralistic ignorance;” 
Bierhoff, 2002).  
Along the same lines, witnesses who feel that they are not competent may have 
doubts about whether their intervention will result in more harm than good. The 
possibility that bystanders succumb to doubts about the benefit and the need for 
intervention raises several deontological issues that blur the moral limits of one’s duty to 
rescue a fellow human being from harm. According to consequentialist thinking (e.g., 
Singer, 1972), a witness is absolved of his moral duty to rescue if his help is neither 
sufficient (i.e., not capable of providing appropriate assistance) nor necessary (e.g., 
another more capable or morally responsible person, such as the parent of the victim, is 
present). Consequentialism even leaves room for uncertainty regarding necessity and 
sufficiency, in which case “the duty has in it a latitude for doing more or less, and no 
specific limits can be assigned to what should be done” (Kant 1996 [1797], 156). In 
bullying situations, those who believe themselves to be “sufficient” as defenders as 
determined through higher self-efficacy beliefs (i.e., beliefs about one’s competence as a 
defender) are indeed more likely to defend or “rescue” their victimized peers (Pöyhönen 
& Salmivalli, 2008; Pöyhönen, Juvonen, & Salmivalli, 2010; Thornberg & Jungert, 
2013). 
Beyond the issue of competence, yet perhaps related to it, is the issue of whether 
rescuing a peer in distress poses a risk of harm to the rescuing agent. For instance, 
bystander processes such as “fear of social blunders” and “audience inhibition” (e.g., 
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Bierhoff, 2002; Hogg & Vaughan, 2008) may have a particularly strong impact on 
children who are more socially anxious; such children may be more likely to remain 
passive due to concerns over embarrassing themselves. Another type of fear that may 
arise in bystanders of bullying situations is the fear that by intervening they may become 
targets themselves. According to research demonstrating the social power of bullies (e.g., 
Mayeux & Cillessen, 2008; Caravita et al., 2009; Juvonen & Galvan, 2008), children who 
step in as defenders may at the very least jeopardize their social status within the peer 
group. Thus, one’s moral duty to rescue a victim in distress may be limited by “the 
comparable cost condition,” a condition that takes into account a rescuing agent’s own 
right to basic well-being (Bauhn, 2011; Quong 2009, 517). According to the utilitarian 
notion of “maximizing the good” (Mill, 1987[1863]), trying to help may actually be 
morally “wrong”  when one considers the possibility that the rescuer may suffer to an 
equal degree as the victim, or that by intervening, the rescuer may add to the distress of 
the victim (in the case of incompetent defending).  
The complexity of evaluating passive bystander behaviour is compounded by a 
methodological issue. Passive bystander behaviour has typically been measured as 
“outsider” status using the peer-reported version of the Participant Role Questionnaire 
(Salmivalli et al., 1996). In the limited number of studies that have investigated the 
association between peer-reported passive bystanding and moral disengagement, a 
negative association has been found with moral disengagement and a low but positive 
correlation found between passive bystanding and defending (e.g., Gini, 2006). In 
contrast, self-reported passive bystanding has been shown to display a negative 
association with defending, and has been related to a lower sense of responsibility to 
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intervene in defense of victims (Pozzoli & Gini, 2010). Thus, while passive bystanding 
may be considered a more avoidant form of bystander behaviour, findings to date imply 
that merely standing by is not necessarily “immoral.”  
In short, although moral disengagement is a cognitive strategy that is postulated to 
dissuade moral action in morally compelling situations and to help cope with such a 
mismatch, socio-emotional factors during bystander situations blur the moral limits of 
passivity. Moreover, there may be individual differences in one’s susceptibility to the 
bystander effect independent of one’s moral character (e.g., self-efficacy, social anxiety). 
Thus, assessing bystander behaviour solely along a moral dimension may be overly 
simplistic. The revised reinforcement sensitivity theory (Gray & McNaughton, 2000) 
offers a framework for formulating hypotheses about how individual differences in 
children’s sensitivity to punishment and sensitivity to reward may modulate bystander 
behaviours. The current study assumed that core personality traits would amplify or 
dampen the bystander effect by influencing one’s response to the inherent ambiguities, 
conflicting information, and potential rewards and punishers of bystander situations. 
Individual Differences in Susceptibility to the Bystander Effect: The Role of 
Personality 
Reinforcement sensitivity theory postulates that individual differences in 
personality are driven by fundamental brain systems that regulate emotionally motivated 
decisions to approach or to avoid situations (Gray, 1970; Gray, 1987; revised by Gray & 
McNaughton, 2000). The behavioural activation system (BAS) is thought to be sensitive 
to reward stimuli in a way that motivates approach behaviours. The behavioural 
inhibition system (BIS) is thought to be the biological basis of anxiety and was originally 
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proposed to be a punishment system that inhibits behaviour in response to conditioned 
aversive stimuli. A later revision of the theory (Gray & McNaughton, 2000) added a third 
control system, the flight, fight, freeze system (FFFS) which has been described as a 
defensive-avoidance system (McNaughton & Corr, 2008). The FFFS is thought to 
modulate responses to all aversive stimuli (conditioned or unconditioned), with the 
specific behavioural response depending on whether escape is possible (flight) or not 
possible (fight or freeze). Also in the revised theory, the BIS is no longer considered to 
merely be a system that is sensitive to punishment, but rather to the detection and 
resolution of conflicting goals created by stimuli that activate both the BAS and the FFFS 
(i.e., both reward and punishment cues). Although the BIS is still considered to underlie 
the experience of anxiety (Wardell, O’Connor, Read, & Colder, 2011), it is now 
classified as a conflict resolution system that does inhibit behaviour, but only until a 
context-appropriate response is activated by either the BAS or the FFFS (Corr, 2002). 
Finally, unlike earlier descriptions of the BIS and the BAS as independent of one another 
(Gray, 1987), the joint-subsystems hypothesis formulated by Corr (2002) holds that these 
brain systems work in an interactive manner to control behaviour. Basically, the 
resolution of approach-avoidance conflicts, which are perceived most in those who have 
a strong BIS, may tip in favor of approach for those who also more sensitive to reward 
cues (i.e., strong BAS).  
Studies exploring the role of BIS-BAS sensitivity in children’s socio-emotional 
and behavioural adjustment have been accumulating over recent years. The BIS has been 
linked with poor perceptions of peer relations and consistently associated with several 
measures of internalizing problems such as depression, anxiety, and behavioural 
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avoidance (e.g., Kingsbury, Coplan, Wilson, Weeks, & Rose-Krasnor, 2013; Coplan, 
Frohlick, & Zelenski, 2006; Muris, Meesters, Kanter, & Timmerman, 2005). While 
studies examining the BAS in children have provided mixed results, significant findings 
point toward a link between the BAS and conduct problems (e.g., Colder & O’Connor, 
2004; Muris et al., 2005). One recent study examined the interplay between the BIS and 
the BAS in predicting children’s socio-emotional functioning and found support for the 
joint subsystems hypothesis (Kingsbury et al., 2013). For instance, higher BIS sensitive 
children were more likely to report depressive symptoms and poor peer relations, except 
if they had higher BAS-sensitivity.  
Although BIS-BAS sensitivity has not been applied to the understanding of 
bullying-related behaviour, the fundamental processes outlined in reinforcement 
sensitivity theory provide a useful framework for predicting differences in bystander 
behaviours. Specifically, activation of overt approach behaviours in bystanders may be a 
response to BAS sensitivity. While some children may have learned to feel rewarded by 
engaging in prosocial behaviour, others may find aggression to be more rewarding. Moral 
disengagement offers an evaluative component that guides predictions regarding the type 
of behaviour that might be most rewarding to a particular child: those who are most 
morally disengaged may find aggressive behaviour rewarding while those who are 
morally engaged may find prosocial behaviour more rewarding. 
BIS sensitivity may also play an essential role in bystander behaviour considering 
the threatening nature of bullying as well as the ambiguities inherent in bullying 
situations that generate approach-avoidance conflicts, and thus feed into the bystander 
effect. Drawing from reinforcement sensitivity theory (Gray & McNaughton, 2000), BIS 
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sensitivity was expected to inhibit behaviour in bystander situations due to a heightened 
perception of conflicting goals given the complexity of bullying situation, the risks 
involved in intervening, and the need to think and act quickly as a defender. For instance, 
bystanders may perceive a conflict between helping a victim by remaining passive, 
helping a victim by intervening, wishing to protect oneself, and desiring to be perceived 
as helpful by others. Importantly, if the child is to approach the bullying situation, 
engagement will be inhibited until the conflict is resolved. A bystander’s response to this 
conflict may be manifested as: 1) inhibition or greater passive bystander behaviour in the 
face of a particularly punishing and anxiety-provoking stimulus (i.e., outright avoidance: 
flight or freeze), or 2) engagement in approach behaviour, but in an overly cautious and 
hesitant manner.  High BIS sensitive individuals may be even more likely to fall under 
the influence of the bystander effect than other witnesses due to a heightened sense of 
uncertainty about what to do, given the tendency to perceive several conflicting goals. 
Due to the processing of perceived conflicting stimuli, children with a high BIS may 
therefore be less efficient at providing the immediate response that is often needed to 
diffuse bullying situations (Craig & Pepler, 1997). Moreover, the inhibitory effect of the 
BIS should be most evident for behaviours that are inconsistent with one’s moral code. In 
other words, the BIS should amplify the effects of moral disengagement (Bandura, 1999).  
The interactive effect of the BIS and the BAS (Corr, 2002) in influencing 
bystander behaviour likely depends on the rewards (e.g., popularity, praise, positive 
affect) and punishers (e.g., rejection, negative affect) a child has learned to associate with 
a given bystander behaviour  It is important to note that developmentally, BIS and BAS 
sensitivity likely plays a role in the formation of these associations, but which specific 
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associations are learned is context-dependent (e.g., some social contexts may reward 
aggressive behaviour). While a child who is BIS sensitive may engage in an approach 
behaviour, this likely requires a stronger BAS to overcome the inhibitory effect of the 
BIS. It is important to recognize that both prosocial behaviour (i.e., defending) and more 
aggressively motivated behaviour (i.e., bullying, bully reinforcing) are expressions of 
approach behaviours. 
Objectives and Hypotheses 
The objective of the current study was to investigate the associations among 
moral disengagement, BIS-BAS sensitivity, and bystander behaviours (i.e., defending, 
passive bystanding, and bully reinforcing). Several hypotheses were formulated by 
synthesizing the postulates of the socio-cognitive theory of moral agency (Bandura, 
1999), the most recent revision of reinforcement sensitivity theory (Gray & McNaughton, 
2000), as well as the joint subsystems hypothesis (Corr, 2002).  
Hypothesized main effects. Moral disengagement was expected to inhibit 
prosocial behaviour and to motivate aggressive behaviour. Thus, higher levels of moral 
disengagement were expected to be related to lower levels of defending and higher levels 
of  bully-reinforcing. The current study operationalized passive bystanding using peer-
reported outsider behaviour (Participant Role Questionnaire; Salmivalli et al., 1996). 
Given the methodological issues highlighted earlier with regard to self- versus peer-
reported passive bystander behaviour, no hypothesis was formulated for the direction of 
association between moral disengagement and passive bystanding. The BIS was expected 
to inhibit approach behaviours and to increase avoidant behaviours. As such, a negative 
main effect was expected for defending and reinforcing and a positive main effect was 
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expected for passive bystanding. The BAS was expected to activate approach behaviours 
and to disinhibit avoidant behaviours. As such, a positive main effect was expected for 
defending and bully reinforcing such that the higher the BAS the higher the likelihood of 
defending and bully reinforcing, and a negative main effect was expected for passive 
bystanding such that the higher the BAS the lower the likelihood of passive bystanding. 
Hypothesized two-way interactions between moral disengagement, the BIS, 
and the BAS. The BIS was expected to inhibit behaviour in a way that matches moral 
cognitions. As such, the BIS was expected to inhibit defending in those who are high on 
moral disengagement and to inhibit bully reinforcing in those who are low on moral 
disengagement. No direction was hypothesized for predicting passive bystanding given 
the plausibility of either direction: a morally engaged child who is high on the BIS may 
hesitate more than others to “take sides” in order to find the best solution for a victim in a 
conflict-ridden and nuanced situation; in contrast, a morally disengaged child who is high 
on the BIS may be even more likely to rationalize bullying resulting in even greater 
avoidant behaviour.  
The BAS was expected to increase approach behaviour especially if it matches 
moral cognitions (i.e., increase defending in those who are morally engaged and increase 
reinforcing in those who are morally disengaged). The interactive effect of moral 
disengagement and the BAS on passive bystanding remained exploratory.  
The BIS and the BAS were expected to interact in predicting approach versus 
avoidant behaviours. It was assumed that for high BIS children to approach bullying 
situations they would also need to have a higher BAS. In contrast, for high BIS children 
to not display avoidant tendencies, they would also need to have a higher BAS. 
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Hypothesized three-way interaction. Given the number of variables included in 
this study, it was unlikely that a three-way interaction between moral disengagement, the 
BIS, and the BAS would be detected. Nonetheless, theory-driven hypotheses were 
formulated and tested as a reference for future work in this budding area of research. The 
assumption once again was that bystander behaviour would align with both personality 
traits and moral cognitions, with BIS sensitivity expected to dampen the activating effect 
of the BAS. 
The aforementioned hypotheses were tested using a design that benefitted from a 
multi-method computer-based data collection procedure that combined self-reports, peer-
reports, and a cognitive task. There are several advantages to having employed a 
computerized assessment procedure (Van den Berg & Cillessen, 2013), including the 
ability to measure the BIS and the BAS using a reaction time task that has been validated 
for child samples and that is adapted to the most recent version of reinforcement 
sensitivity theory: the Point Scoring Reaction Time Task for Children-Revised (PSRTT-
CR; Colder & O’Connor, 2004; Colder, Trucco, Lopez, Hawk, Read, Lengua, Weiczorek 
& Eiden, 2011).  
While self-report and parent-report measures of the BIS and the BAS do exist and 
have been useful in understanding factors related to these fundamental dimensions of 
personality (e.g., Carver & White, 1994; Colder & O’Connor, 2004; Muris, et al., 2005), 
Nisbett and Wilson’s (1977) classic article highlights the limitations of using self-report 
methods to assess mental processes, such as the deeper level processing postulated in 
reinforcement sensitivity theory. Implicit cognitive processes likely account for some of 
the learning and motivational responses influenced by the BIS and BAS. Implicit 
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cognitive processes, as opposed to explicit cognitions are automatic, affect-driven, and 
intuitive and are therefore not easily accessible to conscious thought, and in turn are not 
accurately reported upon via self-report, particularly in younger samples. Despite an 
increased use of methodology that taps into implicit processes in psychological research 
(e.g., the Implicit Association Task; Greenwald & Farnham, 2000), such methods have 
been rarely used in peer relations research (some exceptions:  Lansu, Cillessen, & 
Karremans, 2012; Sandstrom & Jordon, 2008; Rosen, Milich, & Harris, 2007). 
Method 
Participants 
The sample consisted of 130 participants (68 boys and 62 girls) in grades four, 
five, and six, with an average age of 11.36 years (SD = .69; range: 9.47 – 13.61 years; no 
mean differences in age between boys and girls). Over 70% of the participants’ parents 
were born in Canada. The majority of children stated that they mostly spoke English at 
home (66%), with the remainder reporting to speak French or other languages. Culture 
and ethnicity was queried in an open-ended fashion resulting in a diverse response set. 
Parent reports yielded a wide range of socioeconomic status.  
Procedure 
The current study was part of a larger three-way longitudinal study that took place 
between January and June 2012. Prior to the data collection, permission was obtained 
from the local school board, the principals, the teachers, and the parents. Children’s 
assent was also obtained. Nine percent of the original sample was absent at the third time 
point. No gender or age differences were found between the children who were present 
and those who were absent. Multiple imputation was used to deal with missing data (see 
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Results section). Self-report and peer-report questionnaires were administered on netbook 
computers and programmed in Inquisit 3.0 (Seattle, WA:  Millisecond Software). The 
many benefits of computerized assessments over paper and pencil methods are described 
by Van den Berg and Cillessen (2013).  Participants were given school supplies and a t-
shirt as remuneration for being in the study.  
Measures 
Moral disengagement. Moral disengagement was assessed using an abridged 
version of the 32-item Mechanisms of Moral Disengagement Scale (Bandura et al., 
1996). Participants were asked to rate their degree of agreement to 12 statements on a 
five-point Likert scale (1 = strongly disagree to 5 = strongly agree) representing four 
broad dimensions:  restructuring immoral behaviour (3 items, e.g., “It is okay to insult a 
classmate because hitting him or her would be worse”), blaming / dehumanizing the 
victim (3 items, e.g., “Kids who get mistreated usually do something to deserve it”), 
obscuring personal responsibility (3 items, “Kids cannot be blamed for misbehaving if 
their friends pressured them to do it”), and misrepresenting injurious consequences (3 
items, e.g., “Teasing someone does not really hurt them”).  These 12 items were 
randomly assigned to one of three parcels (Little et al., 2002) that would be used as the 
observed measures in latent variable models. Confirmatory analyses showed that these 
parcels were manifestations of a single factor (e.g., omega = .88). 
Peer nominations. Defending, passive bystanding , and bully-reinforcing were 
assessed using peer-reports (Bukowski et al., 2011). Participants were presented with a 
list of the names of every participating classmate along with a description of a form of 
functioning within the peer group. The participants selected the peers that best fit the 
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description (unlimited number of choices, but children could not select themselves). 
Same-sex nominations were used to calculate a participant’s score on a given item. 
Defender, passive bystander, and bully reinforcer status were based on the Participant 
Role Questionnaire (Salmivalli, et al., 1996). Defending was assessed using 3 items 
(omega = .80): “Someone who comforts a student who has been bullied,” “Someone who 
tells others to stop bullying,” and “Someone who tries to make the others stop bullying.” 
Passive Bystander Behaviour was assessed using 2 items (omega = .78): “Someone who 
stays out of bullying situations,” “Someone who doesn’t take sides with anyone during 
bullying situations.” Bully-reinforcing was assessed using 2 items (omega = .78): 
“Comes around to see a bullying situation and laughs,” “Encourages a bully by shouting 
or cheering.” The number of nominations received by each child was adjusted in order to 
reduce bias due to differences in class size (Velasquez et al., 2013).  
Point Scoring Reaction Time Task for Children-Revised (PSRTT-CR; Colder 
& O’Connor, 2004; Colder, et al., 2011).The PSRTT-CR is a computerized task that was 
developed in line with the joint subsystems hypothesis (Corr, 2002), and is therefore 
designed according to the most recent formulation of reinforcement sensitivity theory. 
During the PSRTT-CR, participants are presented with stimuli on a computer screen that 
become associated with reward or punishment. The contingency with reward and 
punishment is based on whether one’s response to the stimuli results in the gain or the 
loss of points. The task involves four experimental blocks presented in a fixed sequence: 
no reward, reward, punishment, and post-punishment. Each block consists of a series of 
50 3-second trials, with each trial presenting a coloured circle above a two-digit odd or 
even number. Participants are instructed to respond to odd numbers with the ‘1’ key and 
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to even numbers with the ‘2’ key and are scored based on their response. Scores for a 
given trial, as well as total scores accumulated across trials were presented at the bottom 
of the screen.  
During all blocks, participants lost two points for incorrect responses. During the 
reward block, participants had the opportunity to gain points for correct responses, with 
the number of points dependent upon reaction time (points = 835/RT). While participants 
had been instructed to ignore the colour of the presented circle during the no reward and 
reward blocks, they were instructed that responding to green circles during the 
punishment block would result in a loss of 50% of their accumulated points; all other 
instructions were as during the reward block. They were also told that for the post-
punishment block, they could once again ignore the colour of the circles and that they 
would lose two points for incorrect responses and gain points based on their reaction time 
(exactly as during the reward block).  
Decrease in reaction time during the reward block versus the no reward block was 
hypothesized to reflect BAS motivation. The BIS was assessed using reaction times from 
the post-punishment block, with a decrease in reaction time during green circle trials 
(punish-cue) relative to non-green circle trials hypothesized to reflect a motivational 
conflict based on the activation of both the BAS (potential reward of correctly responding 
to the odd and even number) and the FFFS (sensitivity to punishment learned during the 
previous block in response to green circles).  
The BIS and BAS were computed as standardized residual scores based on 
children’s performance on the PSRTT. For the BAS, the mean reaction time for the no-
reward block was entered as the criterion variable and the mean reaction time for the 
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reward block was entered as the predictor variable; the score was then inversed so that 
those participants whose responses got fastest during the reward versus no-reward blocks 
would have the highest BAS scores. For the BIS, mean reaction time for the green circle 
trials was entered as the criterion and mean reaction time for the non-green circle trials 
entered as the predictor, with the highest BIS score reflecting the greatest increase in 
reaction time between punish-cues (green circle trials) and non-punish cues (non-green 




Given that the BIS and BAS using the PSRTT-CR were only assessed at a single 
time point, this part of the study employed a concurrent design.  
Multiple imputation. Multiple imputation was used to estimate missing data 
according to the method described by Little and colleagues (2011). Five factor scores 
were computed using principal components analysis represented 44% of the variance in 
the original dataset. Missing scores were imputed with the use of the factors scores, sex, 
age, and classroom as anchor variables in Amelia II (Honaker et al., 2012). Twenty 
separate imputed data files were created that included all study variables and that were 
used in the final analyses in Mplus Version 6.0 (Muthen & Muthen, 2010). 
BAS activation. BAS activation was measured using the PSRTT-CR (Colder & 
O’Connor, 2004; Colder, et al., 2011). A related samples t-test indicated that reaction 
times (RTs) decreased during the reward block (M = 908.95 ms, SD = 231.76) compared 
to the no reward block (M = 1011.95 ms, SD = 295.38); t  (129)= -5.98, p < .05; Pearson 
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r = .75,  p < .01. Children’s acceleration in responding when reward was introduced 
suggests the activation of the BAS.     
BIS activation. BIS activation was measured using RTs during the post-
punishment block of the PSRTT-CR (Colder &O’Connor, 2004; Colder, et al., 2011). A 
comparison was made between the average RTs to the 5 green circles versus average RTs 
to the 5 non-green circles that preceded them. A related samples t-test indicated that 
reaction times increased during the green circle trials (M = 966.61 ms, SD = 289.12) 
compared to the non-green circle trials (M = 864.41 ms, SD = 279.89); t (129) = 6.36, p 
< .05; Pearson r = .79, p < .001. Taking more time to respond to cues that were 
previously associated with punishment but that had changed to potentially rewarding cues 
(green circles) suggests the activation of the BIS. That is, inhibited responding is 
presumably due to the processing of conflicting information (i.e., reward versus 
punishment).      
Descriptive statistics and mean differences. The means and standard deviations 
of the study variables are given in Table 2.1. Several analyses were carried out in IBM 
SPSS version 19 in order to determine whether there were any mean differences in the 
study variables as a function of sex and age. Statistical significance was based on an 
alpha level of .05. For simplicity, observed variables were used in these preliminary 
analyses (computed as the mean of each individual item using the aggregated scores of 
the 20 imputed data sets).  
A series of independent samples t-tests revealed that girls received more 
nominations than boys on both peer-reported defending (t (128) = -5.89, p <.05) and 
passive bystanding (t (128) = -6.78, p <.05). Boys reported higher levels of moral 
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disengagement (t (128) = 2.90, p <.05) and received more nominations on overt 
aggression than did girls (t (128) = 3.15, p <.05). Bivariate correlations are given in 
Table 2.2 for boys and girls separately. 
Potential age differences were explored by calculating bivariate correlations 
between age and the study variables. In general, the older the participant the faster the 
average reaction time on the PSRTT-CR trials. Older participants were quicker to 
respond during the Reward block (Pearson r (130) = -.29, p < .05). They were also 
quicker during the Post-punishment block: average green circle trial reaction time 
(Pearson r (130) = -.38, p < .05) and average non-green circle trial reaction time (Pearson 
r (130) = -.37, p < .05). Finally, the older the participant the stronger the BAS activation: 
Pearson r (130) = .27, p < .05). Multiple regression analyses with Sex and Age entered 
on a first step and their interaction on a second step failed to reveal any Sex X Age 
interactions in the study variables.  
Interaction terms. Interaction terms were calculated by first mean centering the 
BIS and BAS scores, as well as the three indicators representing the latent moral 
disengagement variable. Next, all two-way and three-way product terms between moral 
disengagement, the BIS, and the BAS were created by multiplying corresponding 
centered values. Finally, residual centering (Lance, 1988) was conducted in order to deal 
with fundamental problems related to interaction terms such as collinearity with first-
order predictors (Pedhazur, 1982).  This was done by regressing each of the product 
terms onto their corresponding multipliers (i.e., first order predictors), with interaction 




Structural equation modeling was conducted using Mplus Version 6.0 (Muthen & 
Muthen, 2010) to test the moderating effect of the BIS and the BAS on the association 
between moral disengagement and bystander behaviours. All variables aside from sex, 
the BIS and the BAS were represented using latent variables, with the default settings in 
MPlus used to establish metrics for the latent constructs.  
Unique and interactive effects of moral disengagement and personality in 
predicting bystander behaviour. Structural equation modeling was used to test the main 
and interactive effects of moral disengagement and BIS-BAS sensitivity on bystander 
behaviours. Paths were considered to be significant at the .05 level and trends at the .10 
level. The final model was obtained by performing several comparisons that are 
described below.  
Step 1. As a first step, a model containing the main effects of moral 
disengagement, the BIS, and the BAS on the three bystander behaviours was compared 
with a model containing interactions among these predictors. The main effects model 
showed a good fit to the data:  χ2 (41) = 55.94, p > .05, CFI = .97, RMSEA < .05. A model 
that also contained all two-way interactions between moral disengagement, the BIS and 
the BAS also showed a good fit to the data and was not significantly different from the 
main effects model: χ2 (115) =134.29, p > .05, CFI = .98, RMSEA < .05; Δχ
2
(74) = 78.35, p 
> .05. Despite the similar strength of these two models, the more informative two-way 
interactions model was retained for further comparison. This two-way interactions model 
was compared to a model that also included the Moral Disengagement X BIS X BAS 
three-way interaction. The three-way interaction model proved to be a poorer fit to the 
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data, and was therefore abandoned:  χ2 (163) =249.98, p < .05, CFI = .92, RMSEA > .05; 
Δχ2(48) = 115.69, p < .05. 
Step 2. As a second step, the effect of sex, aggression, and victimization were 
explored as covariates of the bystander behaviours. This was done by running a series of 
models that included all main and two-way interactive effects of the moral and 
personality variables, and that tested all combinations of the three covariates. Compared 
with the no-covariates two-way interactions model described in step 1, a model that 
included sex as a covariate had a significantly poorer fit to the data: χ2 (125) =153.38, p < 
.05, CFI = .97, RMSEA > .05; Δχ2(10) = 19.09, p < .05. In contrast, controlling for 
aggression and victimization produced a model that had just as strong a fit to the data as 
the no-covariates model: χ2 (196) =204.61, p > .05, CFI = .99, RMSEA < .05; Δχ
2
(81) = 
70.32, p > .05. Note that the third item for victimization was dropped due to its strong 
overlap with aggression, and the significantly poorer fit to the data that was produced 
with its inclusion. It was especially important to control for the effect of aggression on 
bully reinforcing as doing so changed the pattern of results. BAS sensitivity was a 
significant predictor of bully reinforcing in a model that controlled for aggression ( = 
.12, p < .05, one-tailed;   = .06, p = n.s, without controlling for aggression). Also, the 
predictive effect of Moral Disengagement x BIS on bully reinforcing did not reach 
significance in a model that controlled for aggression ( = .06, p = n.s.;  = .37, p < .05 
without controlling for aggression). Next, the predictive effect of BIS x BAS on 
reinforcing weakened to a trend by controlling for aggression ( = .11, p < .10, one-tailed 
test;  = 28, p < .05 without controlling for aggression).  
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Step 3. As a third and final step, the models were tested separately for boys and 
for girls in a series of multiple group models. Due to the scarcity of research in this area, 
no sex differences were hypothesized for any of the paths in the model. The 
unconstrained multiple group model (boys versus girls) was a good fit to the data and did 
not differ significantly from the full sample model: χ2 (418) =430.33, p > .05, CFI = .99, 
RMSEA < .05; Δχ2 (222) = 225.72, p > .05. The data were then analyzed by constraining 
all paths to be equal for boys and for girls: χ2 (446) = 469.15, p > .05, CFI = .98, RMSEA < 
.05. Although the fit of this fully constrained multiple group model was just as strong as 
the fit of the total sample model, it tended to be a weaker fit to the data than the 
unconstrained multiple group model, suggesting that boys and girls may differ on certain 
paths: Δχ2(28) = 38.82, p < .10. Continued exploration revealed that constraining two 
paths in particular produced a weaker fit to the data than did the unconstrained multiple 
group model: (1) the main effect of moral disengagement on passive bystanding (χ2 (419) = 
435.88, p > .05, CFI = .99, RMSEA < .05; Δχ2(1) = 5.55, p < .05) and (2) the main effect 
of BIS on passive bystanding (χ2 (419) = 453.71, p > .05, CFI = .97, RMSEA < .05; Δχ
2
(1) 
= 23.38, p < .05). Given that no other sex differences were found, the total sample model 
(that included aggression and victimization as covariates) was retained as the final model, 
although sex differences on the two main effects paths are highlighted in Figure 2.1, 
which gives the standardized path coefficients for the final model. For greater clarity, 
correlations are given in Table 2.4. Significant trends are reported as they provide 
information about the overall pattern of findings. One-tailed tests were considered to be 
acceptable if the expected direction of effect was specified a priori.  
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As seen in Figure 2.1, there were several main effects in the expected directions: 
higher levels of BAS predicted higher bully reinforcing, higher levels of BIS predicted 
lower defending and higher passive bystanding, and higher moral disengagement 
predicted lower levels of defending behaviour. Beyond these main effects, several two-
interactions were also found. As expected, the BIS made it more likely that higher moral 
disengagement would be related to lower defending (see Figure 2.2). The inverse 
expectation that the BIS would made it more likely that higher moral disengagement 
would be related to higher bully reinforcing was only met in a model that did not control 
for aggression (as explained above). In the final model that included aggression as a 
covariate, the BIS instead moderated the association between moral disengagement and 
aggression, which is in line with the main hypotheses of the study (see Figure 2.3). The 
interactive effect of Moral Disengagement x BAS on defending and bully reinforcing are 
illustrated in Figures 2.4 and 2.5, respectively. Both are in the expected direction of the 
BAS increasing the likelihood of defending in those lowest on moral disengagement, 
while increasing the likelihood of bully reinforcing in those who are most morally 
disengaged. As shown in Figures 2.6 and 2.7, the BIS and the BAS interacted to predict 
defending and bully reinforcing such that higher BIS children were more likely to engage 
in these behaviours if they were also higher on BAS. Finally, the exploration of a Moral 
Disengagement x BIS interaction in predicting passive bystanding revealed that the BIS 
made the association between moral disengagement and passive bystanding more 
negative. This interaction is plotted separately for boys and for girls to facilitate 
interpretation in light of sex differences found in the association between moral 
67 
 
disengagement and passive bystanding noted earlier (see Figure 2.8 for boys and Figure 
2.9 for girls).  
It is important to note that age and accuracy on the PSRTT-CR were originally 
included as control variables, but were not retained in the final model because they did 
not produce any significant effects on the bystander behaviours.  
Discussion 
What determines which behaviour a child adopts when witnessing a bullying 
episode? The current investigation has shown that bystander behaviour depends on a 
combination of a child’s personality and his or her moral cognitions. The central 
hypothesis was that children’s sensitivity to behavioural activation and inhibition would 
predict whether they approach or avoid bullying situations, and that moral disengagement 
strategies would predict which form of approach behaviour might be most motivating 
(i.e., defending or bully reinforcing). Taken together, the findings obtained provided 
partial support for hypotheses derived from both reinforcement sensitivity theory (Gray 
& McNaughton, 2000) and the socio-cognitive theory of moral agency (Bandura, 1999).  
Active Bystander Behaviours: Defending and Bully Reinforcing 
As hypothesized, moral disengagement inhibited defending, but only in those who 
were high on the BIS. Similarly, moral disengagement increased the likelihood of bully 
reinforcing, but only in those who were high on the BIS. The latter was only detected in a 
model that did not control for aggression. With the inclusion of aggression in the model, 
the effect observed for bully reinforcing was subdued and observed instead for 
aggression, suggesting the potential moderating role of aggression on bully reinforcing. 
The findings for aggression are in line with one of the main hypotheses of the study: 
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essentially, children appear to be motivated to behave in line with their moral code, 
especially if they are BIS sensitive. It may be the case that conflicting goals are not 
perceived in bullying situations for those who are at the extremes of the moral 
disengagement scale, thus reducing the otherwise inhibitory effect of the BIS. In other 
words, high BIS children may know what is “right” or “wrong” for them to do and may 
have developed a tendency to engage in approach behaviours in such situations due to 
learned associations with positive consequences. This interpretation is in line with the 
tenets of reinforcement sensitivity theory and the socio-cognitive theory of moral agency, 
both of which make fundamental references to learning processes (e.g., Eysenck, 1967; 
Bandura, 1977). Of course the current study was limited by its concurrent design and 
future studies that examine over-time effects are necessary to track the development of 
bystander behaviours as a function of moral cognitions and personality. 
Interestingly, similar levels of defending were observed in low BIS-sensitive 
children regardless of level of moral disengagement. The motivation for defending in 
children who justify aggression is unclear and requires further study of other potential 
moderators. For instance, the form of defending (e.g., aggressive versus non-aggressive 
defending) may need to be considered (Rubinstein, 2005), or perhaps the relationship 
between the moral agent and the child in need of help (Bukowski & Sippola, 1996).  
What is clear however, is that the association between moral disengagement and both 
defending and aggression disappears for children who are low on the BIS, suggesting that 
BIS sensitivity provides a way of keeping one’s behaviour consonant with one’s moral 
cognitions, for better or for worse.  
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In terms of behavioural activation, as expected higher BAS-sensitivity amplified 
defending in those lowest on moral disengagement. The BAS also tended to amplify bully 
reinforcing in those highest on moral disengagement, even after controlling for 
aggression. This result suggests that, similar to the BIS, the BAS activates behaviour that 
is most in line with one’s moral cognitions. Behaviours that are aligned with moral 
cognitions may be the most rewarding, especially for children who are high on the BAS. 
Indeed, for children who were least reward responsive as gauged by a low BAS, the 
association between moral disengagement and defending disappeared, indicating that 
moral thought alone may not be sufficient to motivate defending behaviour (e.g., 
Caravita, Gini, & Pozzoli, 2012).  
A similar argument may be made for bully reinforcing in that the expression of 
moral thought in this group of bystanders may depend on motivational factors related to 
personality. In a model that controlled for aggression, the main effect of moral 
disengagement on bully reinforcing disappeared, yet a trend level interactive effect of 
Moral Disengagement x BAS remained. In contrast, aggression was positively associated 
with moral disengagement and not related to the BAS, highlighting the unique predictive 
power of moral cognitions on aggressive behaviour. The finding that bully reinforcing 
behaviour is manifested in those who legitimize harmful behaviour only if they are high 
on the BAS, while aggressive children are higher on moral disengagement independent of 
BAS-sensitivity points toward potential heterogeneity in bully reinforcing behaviour: 
aggressive versus non-aggressive forms. Non-aggressive bully reinforcers (a minority in 
our sample) may require a high BAS to manifest their morally disengaged cognitions 
(i.e., through behaviours such as cheering bullies rather than doing the bullying 
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themselves). With the strong overlap between bully reinforcing and aggression found in 
our moderately-sized sample, it is not possible to fully explore differences between 
highly aggressive bully reinforcers and less aggressive bully reinforcers. Once again, 
future studies that include aggression as a moderator are essential to teasing apart its 
effect on bystander behaviours, especially different forms of defending and different 
forms of bully-reinforcing.  
Finally, there was a trend-level interaction between the BIS and the BAS in 
predicting both defending and bully reinforcing, thus validating the importance of 
considering the combined influence of both dimensions of personality (Corr, 2002; 
Kingsbury et al., 2013; Wardell et al., 2011). It appears that children who are high on the 
BIS, and presumably most inhibited in conflict-laden situations, may also need to be high 
on the BAS in order to engage in more active bystander behaviours. The assumption is 
that these children must find defending, or alternatively bully reinforcing to be especially 
rewarding for their BAS to override the inhibitory effect of the FFFS that is associated 
with higher BIS sensitivity. Interestingly, those low on the BIS showed similar levels of 
defending regardless of their BAS. The reason for defending in this group of children is 
unclear, other than the fact that they are not inhibited by BIS sensitivity. Future studies 
with greater statistical power may reveal a three-way interaction between moral 
disengagement, the BIS, and the BAS that was not detected in the current study. The 
expectation is that the behavioural manifestation of one’s moral cognitions (i.e., 
prosociality versus aggression) will be moderated by a combined effect of the BIS and 




The current study also allowed for important conclusions with regard to passive 
bystander behaviour as operationalized using peer nomination items from the outsider 
scale of the Participant Role Questionnaire (Salmivalli et al., 1996). The findings were 
quite compelling in emphasizing the complexity of bystander behaviour, and the possible 
short-sightedness of viewing bystanders as lacking moral agency. As expected, children 
who displayed more passive bystanding were found to have a higher BIS, thus 
highlighting the role of personality in shaping avoidant behaviour (this effect was 
strongest in girls). Furthermore, moral disengagement had a significant main effect on 
passive bystanding, with boys and girls displaying a reverse pattern: boys were less likely 
to be perceived as passive bystanders at higher levels of moral disengagement (similar to 
the pattern expected of prosocial behaviour) while girls were more likely to be perceived 
as passive bystanders at higher levels of moral disengagement (a pattern expected of non-
prosocial behaviour). This finding may be related to gender stereotypes (e.g., Maccoby & 
Jacklin, 1987) that likely generate a double standard for bystander behaviour with girls 
being held to a higher prosocial norm. The existence of different gender ideals for passive 
bystanding is in line with a recent study concluding that moral action in school children 
who witness peers in distress is dictated by conformity to a set of moral frames, including 
the “gentle caring-girl” frame that reflects a greater expectation for girls to be nicer and 
more caregiving than boys (Thornberg, 2010). As such, it is not surprising that passive 
bystanding overlaps with self-reported moral engagement in boys and moral 
disengagement in girls.  
72 
 
Beyond the main effects of the BIS and moral disengagement, a significant 
interaction was found between moral disengagement and the BIS that was equally valid 
for boys and for girls: the association between moral disengagement and passive 
bystanding was observed to become more negative at higher levels of BIS. Variability in 
passive bystanding as a function of the BIS was most evident for children who were 
morally engaged. It is not clear why moral engagement in high BIS children is related to 
both greater passive bystanding and greater defending behaviour. It may be the case that 
there is heterogeneity in morally engaged children who are also BIS sensitive. Although 
children in this group may be equally prone to detecting conflicting goals in bullying 
situations, they may differ in terms of how they resolve those conflicts: some may be 
driven by the BAS that activates more defending and less passive bystanding, while 
others may be driven by the FFFS and therefore respond with greater passivity. In other 
words, some morally engaged and high BIS children may choose to remain outside the 
bullying situation, not due to anxious responding rather due to prior learning and 
reflection about the best course of action for the victim (and themselves). In contrast, 
other high BIS and morally engaged children may have learned to defend, perhaps due to 
previous successful interventions and a greater sense of self-efficacy as defenders 
(Pöyhönen & Salmivalli, 2008; Pöyhönen et al., 2010; Thornberg & Jungert, 2013). Such 
a possibility has important implications for training defender behaviour in passive 
bystanders in a way that better matches their disposition (e.g., encourage private forms of 
peer intervention such as befriending and comforting, in addition to more public and 
direct forms of defending). This suggestion is in line with previous recommendations to 
socialize safe defending strategies (Salmivalli, 2010).  
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Another interpretation stems from the significant positive overlap that emerged 
between defending and passive bystanding independent of the main and interactive 
effects. Basically, some children have gained the reputation among their peers of 
engaging in both bystander behaviours. This possibility further supports the conclusion 
that children who refrain from defending their victimized peers in favor of taking on a 
passive bystander role are not necessarily lacking in moral character. Determining the 
different circumstances under which the same child engages in different bystander 
behaviours merits further study (e.g., the social status of the victim, the relationship 
between the bystander and the victim or bully).  
Conclusions 
Understanding the predictors of bystander behaviours during bullying situations is 
critical to identifying ways of recruiting peer defenders. The current study applied a 
design that was sensitive to multiple biopsychosocial systems influencing bystanders 
during complex bullying situations and has provided nuanced information for 
interventions aimed at reducing school bullying. Findings point toward heterogeneity in 
morally engaged children in relation to fundamental personality traits. Specifically, moral 
engagement was found to be related to both higher passivity and higher defending in 
children who are BIS sensitive, and also to higher defending in BAS sensitive children. 
On the flip side, a higher BAS was found to enhance bully-reinforcing in morally 
disengaged children. It seems then that moral cognitions, personality, and behaviours are 
aligned. Importantly, the finding that children’s passivity was related to personality traits 
that inhibit the manifestation of prosocial thought suggests that even the most inhibited 
children may be recruited as defenders if they receive specialized training to defend in a 
74 
 
way that matches their personality. Moreover, given the parallels between the pattern of 
findings for defenders and bully reinforcers, the mechanisms that underlie these clearly 
distinct bystander behaviours may be quite similar. This implies that interventions that 
target the morally disengaged cognitions of bully reinforcers may result in alternative 
behavioural expressions of their personality traits – traits that bully reinforcers share with 
some defenders (e.g., a high BAS). This important and growing area of research may be 
furthered by studies that track the developmental trajectory of bystander behaviours in 
relation to morality and personality and that investigate the moderating effect of factors 
such as aggression and gender, as well as contextual factors such as the relationship 
between bystander and victim. The study presented in the following chapter elaborates on 
one of these directions by investigating the role of friendship in moderating the 




Table 2.1.  Descriptive statistics for the study variables for boys and for girls. 
 
Boys 
(n = 68)  
Girls 
(n = 62) 
 
Mean (SD) Min Max 
 
Mean (SD) Min Max 
Age_years 11.28 (0.75) 9.47 13.61 
 
11.44 (0.62) 10.03 12.95 
Moral Disengagement 2.27 (0.79) 1.00 4.73 * 1.91 (0.56) 1.00 3.00 
BISa -.02 (.79) -2.43 1.55 
 
-.01 (1.11) -2.16 3.02 
BASb -.04 (1.01) -3.34 2.21 
 
.10 (.75) -2.29 1.93 
Defending .95 (.86) -.01 3.82 * 1.94 (1.06) -.01 4.17 
Passive Bystanding .82 (.74) -.01 3.03 * 1.97 (1.18) .04 4.75 
Reinforcing .48 (.66) .00 2.61 
 
.32 (.55) .00 2.65 
Bullying .71 (.96) .00 3.77 * .28 (.51) .00 3.21 
Victimization .55 (.53) .02 2.44 
 
.46 (.67) .00 3.86 
Reward Block RT 926 (255) 477 1844 
 
895 (210) 555 1437 
No Reward Block RT 1009 (305) 566 2385 
 
1007 (287) 575 1859 
Punish cue RTc 964 (278) 399 1823 
 
978 (245) 425 1675 
Pre-punish cue RTd 862 (300) 393 1770 
 
879 (275) 378 1730 
*Significant sex difference based on an independent samples t-test (p < .05). 
aStandardized residual scores (No Reward RT predicting Reward RT; inversed), 
bStandardized residual scores (Pre-punish cue RT predicting Punish cue RT during the 
Post-punishment block), c Mean RT to green circle trials during the Post-punishment 
block, d Mean RT to trials preceding green circle trials during the Post-punishment block. 
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3. BIS -.07 
 




















-.31 * -.04 
 
5. Defending -.09 
 








-.40 ** -.41 ** -.43 ** 
























-.26 * -.24 * – 
 
.81 ** .40 ** 








-.30 * -.15 
 
.75 ** – 
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.45 ** .44 ** – 
 









Table 2.3.  Significant correlations in the final path model. 
Standardized path coefficients. 
Correlated variables   
Defending   Passive Bystanding .41 * 
Moral Disengagement  Aggression  .18 * 
Moral Disengagement  BISXBAS -.24 * 
BAS    Moral Disengagement XBIS -.20 * 
Aggression    Moral Disengagement XBIS .41 * 
Moral Disengagement XBAS Moral Disengagement XBIS -.25 * 
Moral Disengagement XBASBISXBAS .45 * 




Figure 2.2. Moral Disengagement X BIS on defending 
 
Figure 2.3. Moral Disengagement X BIS on aggression 
 
 
p < .05 
p < .05 
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Figure 2.4. Moral Disengagement X BAS on defending 
 
Figure 2.5. Moral Disengagement X BAS on bully reinforcing 
 
p < .10, one-tailed 
p < .05, one-tailed 
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Figure 2.6. BIS X BAS on defending 
 
Figure 2.7. BIS X BAS on bully reinforcing 
 
 
p < .10, one-tailed 
p < .10, one-tailed 
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Figure 2.9. Moral Disengagement X BIS on girls’ passive bystanding  
 
p < .10 
p < .10 
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Chapter 3: How Victimized is my Best Friend? Friendship Motives Counteract the 
Inhibitory Effect of Moral Disengagement on Defending Behaviour 
Bullying is a form of aggression that accrues or loses power for the bully as a 
function of bystander behaviours (Salmivalli et al., 1996).  In spite of the present concern 
with identifying the individual and environmental factors that shape bystander behaviours 
during bullying situations, there has been remarkably little emphasis on understanding the 
role of the relationship between a bystander and a victim. In other words, within the 
group context there may be critical interpersonal contexts that influence individual 
bystander action. The current study aimed to address this issue by investigating the effect 
of friendship on defending behaviour. The study examined whether children would 
increase their defending behaviour in accordance with the victimization level of their best 
friend, and whether such friendship motives would override the inhibitory forces of moral 
disengagement.    
The Need for Defenders 
Student bystanders are critical players in the occurrence, frequency, and severity 
of school bullying (Lagerspetz et al., 1982; Salmivalli et al., 1996; Craig & Pepler, 1997). 
Researchers have demonstrated that bystanders are often present in large proportions 
during bullying episodes and that they participate in the bullying process by taking on 
different roles that can either diminish or exacerbate bullying behaviour. Even those 
bystanders who behave in seemingly harmless and passive ways may influence the 
bullying process.  
In recent years, there has been increasing interest in understanding defending 
behaviour. Defenders are the more active bystanders who take on a prosocial role. They 
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may step in to support victims in very public ways such as directly standing up to 
aggressors, but they may also help by comforting and befriending victims after a harmful 
incident. The reason why there has been interest in defending behaviour is because 
defenders have been found to be important on multiple levels. Their impact at the group 
level has been demonstrated by the lower frequency of bullying in classrooms with more 
defending (Salmivalli et al., 2011). These classroom effects seem to trickle down to the 
level of individual victims with evidence that high risk children such as those who are 
socially anxious or rejected by peers have a lower likelihood of being victimized in 
classrooms with higher levels of defending, and also in classrooms with lower levels of 
bully-reinforcement (Kärnä, Voeten, Poskiparta, & Salmivalli, 2010). Finally, studies that 
have examined dyadic relationships have found that being defended is positively 
associated with victims’ self-esteem and social status (Sainio, Veenstra, Huitsing, & 
Salmivalli, 2011) and that having a reciprocated friendship buffers victimized children 
from increased internalizing and externalizing behaviours (Hodges, Boivin, Vitaro, & 
Bukowski, 1999). This last point speaks to dyadic processes outlined in interpersonal 
theories that suggest that positive experiences with peers, especially intimate friendships 
can provide a protective experience that minimizes the damage done in other 
interpersonal contexts (Sullivan, 1953). For a victim, this correction may occur due to a 
sense of being worthy enough for someone to stick up for them or to befriend them. 
Despite increasing knowledge into the correlates and benefits of defending, there still 
remains a need to identify specific factors that contribute to the defense of victims, and to 
examine these effects over time.  
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The Morality of Bullying and Bystanding 
Bullying has been conceptualized along moral parameters (Arsenio & Lemerise, 
2001), and its unjust nature is clear by its definition as an intentional act of harm by a 
relatively more powerful perpetrator toward a more vulnerable victim. Bandura and 
colleagues’ socio-cognitive theory of moral agency (Bandura et al., 1996) provides an 
explanation for why moral agency may become inhibited in morally compelling 
situations such as bullying. The theory defines the construct of moral disengagement as a 
cognitive strategy involving the legitimization of harmful behaviour in situations when 
one has violated, or anticipates violating one’s generally-held moral standards. This 
results in the selective inhibition of moral emotions and disregard for moral self-censures 
that would otherwise function to motivate prosocial behaviour, or at least some form of 
reparation if harm has already been done. Instead, individuals feel justified and motivated 
for aggressive behaviour, or in the case of bystanders, are tolerant of other’s aggression. 
As expected by the theory, moral disengagement has been found to be a reliable correlate 
of bullying behaviour (e.g., Menesini et al., 2003; Hymel et al., 2005) with increasing 
evidence of its predictive effect on bullying (Barchia & Bussey, 2011a) and on more 
general forms of aggression (Paciello et al., 2008). 
What About Prosocial Behaviour? 
Although Bandura’s framework has enhanced our understanding of aggressive 
behaviour and bullying in youth, a significant aspect of his theory that has remained 
largely neglected is the power of moral engagement to motivate prosocial behaviour. 
According to the theory, moral disengagement is unnecessary in those who are morally 
agentive, suggesting a negative association between moral disengagement and prosocial 
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behaviour. Along these lines, a handful of studies have highlighted that lower levels of 
moral disengagement are related to defending behaviour. Specifically, there is evidence 
of a small but significant negative correlation between moral disengagement and 
defending (e.g., Caravita, Gini, & Pozzoli, 2012; Gini, 2006). Moral disengagement has 
also been found to differentiate defenders from bullies (e.g., Gini, 2006; Menesini et al., 
2003; Gini et al., 2011). However, one published longitudinal study investigating this link 
did not find a significant association in a model containing several covariates. Instead it 
showed that that empathy and collective efficacy beliefs (i.e., beliefs about school-wide 
efforts and ability to stop aggression) explained variance in defending behaviour over 
time (Barchia & Bussey, 2011b).  This finding raises questions about the factors that may 
strengthen or weaken the association between moral disengagement and defending.  
The Friendship Context 
One factor that may account for variability in defending behaviour, as well as 
variability in the association between moral disengagement and defending, is the 
relationship between a bystander and a victim. While friendship is recognized as a critical 
context for development in childhood (Bukowski, Motzoi, & Meyer, 2009), its relation to 
morality has received surprisingly little empirical attention by social scientists. Bukowski 
and Sippola (1996) argue that morality has important interpersonal components and that 
friendship, in particular, may serve as a context for moral development. For instance, 
within the context of friendship, children learn important moral lessons about 
responsibility, benevolence, and trust, with these lessons sometimes assimilated as a 
consequence of breaking moral rules (e.g., betrayal). Friends also serve as moral models 
or reinforcers as suggested by the findings of a recent study where moral disengagement 
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in early adolescents was shown to change over time to match ones friend’s level of moral 
disengagement (Caravita, Sijtsema, Rambaran, & Gini, 2013). Another study found that a 
child’s reciprocal best friend’s bullying attitudes and sense of responsibility to intervene 
in favour victims predicts the child’s levels on these measures (Pozzoli & Gini, 2013). 
Although morality may develop within the context of friendship, friendship 
motives may give rise to partiality or favoritism toward friends versus non-friends 
(Keller, 2004a; Hoffman, 2000). In other words, moral obligations motivated by concern 
for a friend may at times take precedence over more general moral duties to others, 
pointing toward the importance of considering particularity in moral behaviour and 
judgment. This contextual nature of morality emerges in multiple lines of theory and 
research. It can be seen in conceptualizations of morality according to an ethic of care 
(Gilligan, 1982) in contrast to the universalism emphasized in an ethic of justice 
(Kohlberg, 1976). More specifically, the relational context of moral cognitions is 
supported by studies that have demonstrated that moral evaluations, judgments, and 
emotions regarding moral situations are influenced by social closeness (Linke, 2012). 
Moreover, research on empathy, which is theorized to be a root of morality has 
highlighted that empathic responsiveness is subject to contextual modulation, influenced 
by such factors as familiarity and similarity between empathizer and target (de 
Vignemont & Singer, 2006; Eisenberg & Strayer, 1987). 
More specific to the subject of friendship and morality, there is evidence that 
children’s moral judgments of a transgression depend on whether or not a friend is 
implicated (Blum, 1980; Slomkowski & Killen 1992). Furthermore, the degree of 
interpersonal biases in moral reasoning has been found to vary cross-culturally in 
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accordance with culture-specific functions and definitions of friendship (Keller, 2004b; 
Keller, Edelstein, Schmidt, Fang, & Fang, 1998). For instance, when presented with a 
friendship dilemma involving the choice between keeping a promise to a best friend or 
accepting an interesting invitation from a new child in the class, Chinese children 
articulated the moral quality of close friendships as well as a tight connection between 
friends and society (Keller et al., 1998). This pattern corresponded to Chinese children’s 
tendency to be more altruistic toward the new child compared to Western children, who 
in turn were more likely to emphasize promise-keeping motives and friendship quality. 
Importantly, developmental differences were noted with close friendships becoming 
equally important across cultures during adolescence.   
Based on the foregoing review, it seems that children may have a separate moral 
code for friends and non-friends, particularly as they enter adolescence. This difference 
may be manifested behaviourally as different helping responses, which in a bullying 
situation may involve motivation to help a specific friend even though the child may have 
a dampened sense of moral obligation toward others due to the inhibitory forces of moral 
disengagement.  
Objective and Hypotheses 
The principal hypothesis of the current study was that defending behaviour would 
depend on both moral disengagement and on the level of need of one’s best friend (as 
gauged by how victimized he or she is). The hypothesized negative association between 
defending and moral disengagement was expected to be weaker for children with a best 
friend who was higher on peer victimization. In other words, the likelihood that moral 
disengagement would predict decreased defending was expected to be strongest in those 
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children who do not have best friends who are victimized. For children with victimized 
best friends, moral disengagement was expected to have less of an influence on changes 
in defending behaviour. As such, morally disengaged children’s defending was expected 
to be more dependent on whether or not they have a victimized best friend as compared 
with the defending behaviour of morally engaged children, which was expected to be 
more impartial. Aggression was included in analyses in order to uncover unique effects of 
moral disengagement and best friend victimization on defending behaviour. Sex 
differences were also explored.  
Method 
Participants 
The sample consisted of 130 boys (n = 68) and girls (n = 62) averaging 11.36 
years of age (SD = .69; range: 9.47 – 13.61 years) drawn from the fourth, fifth, and sixth 
grades of two English-language public schools in a Canadian city. Prior to beginning the 
data collection, parental consent, children’s assent, and permission from the teachers and 
all relevant school-related boards and personnel were obtained. The majority of 
participants and their parents (>70%) were born in Canada with most children reporting 
to speak English at home (66%), with the rest reporting to speak French and/or another 
language. A diverse response set was provided by children with regard to ethnicity and 
by parents with regard to socioeconomic status.  
Procedure 
Data for the current study was obtained from two time points in January and May-
June 2012 (4 months apart). Nine percent of the original sample was not present during 
the final data collection due to various reasons (e.g., illness, out of town). There were no 
90 
 
differences in gender or age between the group of absent children and those who were 
present during the last time point. Missing data were handled using multiple imputation 
(as explained in the Results section). Netbook computers were used to administer self-
report and peer-report questionnaires programmed using Inquisit 3.0 (Seattle, WA:  
Millisecond Software), providing several methodological advantages over traditional 
paper and pencil methods (Van den Berg & Cillessen, 2013).  Participants received 
school supplies and a t-shirt as remuneration for being in the study. 
Measures 
Moral Disengagement. The measure of moral disengagement was based on the 
Mechanisms of Moral Disengagement Scale (Bandura et al., 1996). Participants were 
asked to rate their degree of agreement to 12 statements on a five-point Likert scale (1 = 
strongly disagree to 5 = strongly agree). This abridged scale captured the four broad 
dimensions of the larger measure:  restructuring immoral behaviour (3 items, e.g., “It is 
okay to insult a classmate because hitting him or her would be worse”), blaming / 
dehumanizing the victim (3 items, e.g., “Kids who get mistreated usually do something to 
deserve it”), obscuring personal responsibility (3 items, “Kids cannot be blamed for 
misbehaving if their friends pressured them to do it”), and misrepresenting injurious 
consequences (3 items, e.g., “Teasing someone does not really hurt them”).  The 12 items 
were randomly assigned to one of three parcels (Little et al., 2002) that were used as 
observed variables in the modeling of a latent variable. As seen in previous studies, 
confirmatory analyses showed that these parcels were manifestations of a single factor 
(T1 omega = .82; T2 omega = .88). 
91 
 
Sociometric nominations. Participants were asked to select their first best friend 
from a list of all the participating boys and then girls (separate list) in their classroom. 
This was done in order to identify each participant’s first same-sex best friend. Once 
identified, victimization scores were derived for this best friend from the peer nomination 
tool described below. 
Peer Nominations. Defending, victimization, and aggression (used as a control 
variable) were measured with peer assessments (Bukowski et al., 2011). Participants were 
presented with a list of the names of every participating classmate along with a 
description of a form of functioning. The participants were asked to select an unlimited 
number of peers that matched each description, but could not choose him or herself. The 
number of nominations received by a participant from same-sex peers for a given item 
was used as the participant’s score on that item. Defending was measured using three 
items taken from the Participant Role Questionnaire (Salmivalli, et al., 1996): “Someone 
who comforts a student who has been bullied,” “Someone who tells others to stop 
bullying,” and “Someone who tries to make the others stop bullying” (T1 omega = .80, 
T2 omega = .79). Victimization was measured using three items: “Someone who gets 
called bad names and gets made fun of,” “Someone who gets hit and pushed around in a 
mean way,” and “Others spread nasty rumors about him/her” (T1 omega = .86; T2 omega 
= .75). Aggression was assessed using three items “Someone who hurts others 
physically,” “Someone who hits, pushes or shoves others in a mean way,” and “Someone 
who insults or threatens others” (T1 omega = .94; T3 omega = .93). In order to reduce the 
bias in scores due to variations in class size, the number of nominations received by each 





Multiple imputation. Missing data was handled using multiple imputation (Little 
et al., 2011). Five factor scores were calculated using principal components analysis. 
These factors represented 44% of the variance in the original dataset, and were used as 
anchor variables (in addition to sex, age, and classroom) in the creation of twenty 
separate imputed data sets using Amelia II software (Honaker et al., 2012). Final analyses 
were performed in MPlus Version 6.0 (Muthén & Muthén, 2010; TYPE = 
IMPUTATION). 
Descriptive statistics and mean differences. For simplicity, observed variables 
(calculated as the mean of all items for a given measure) were used in preliminary 
descriptive analyses carried out in IBM SPSS version 19. Table 3.1 displays means, 
standard deviations, and maximum and minimum values for the total sample, as well as 
means and standard deviations for boys and girls separately. Bivariate correlations are 
given in Table 3.2, highlighting several main effects of sex on the study variables, 
namely that girls are perceived to be higher on defending, boys are perceived to be higher 
on aggression, girls have best friends who are perceived to be lower on victimization, and 
boys report higher levels of moral disengagement.    
Interaction terms. Interaction terms were obtained by first mean centering the 
indicators representing the latent moral disengagement and best friend victimization 
variables. Next, three product terms were created by randomly multiplying each of the 
three centered moral disengagement indicators with each of the three centered best friend 
victimization indicators. Residual centering (Lance, 1988) was employed in order to deal 
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with fundamental problems associated with interaction terms (e.g., collinearity with first-
order predictors; Pedhazur, 1982).  This was done by regressing each of the product terms 
onto their corresponding multipliers (i.e., first order predictors). The resulting 
residualized scores were used to represent the three indicators of the latent Moral 
Disengagement x Best Friend Victimization interaction variable.  
Final Analyses: The moderating effect of best friend victimization on the association 
between moral disengagement and subsequent defending behaviour 
A latent variable model, shown in Figure 3.1, containing measures of defending, 
best friend victimization, moral disengagement, and aggression, as well as the interaction 
between best friend victimization and moral disengagement was tested using structural 
equation modeling with MPlus. Several path analyses were modeled and tested with sex 
included as a control variable given the significant mean differences between sexes. First, 
a stability model with paths linking a given measure from T1 to T2 was tested and then 
compared to a model containing cross lagged paths between measures across time. 
Finally, a multigroup procedure was used to assess sex differences in the findings. The 
goodness of fit of these models was compared using the Chi squared difference test.  
Although the initial stability model showed an adequate level of fit (χ2 (241) = 
352.40, p < .05, CFI = .95, RMSEA > .05) the second model that included the cross 
lagged paths was found to be significantly better (χ2 (236) = 331.29, p < .05, CFI = .95, 
RMSEA > .05; Δχ2 (12) = 21.11, p < .05). The fit of a third model that included the 
interaction between moral disengagement and best friend victimization had the same 
goodness of fit as that of the cross lagged model (χ2 (296) = 371.10, p < .05, CFI = .97, 
RMSEA < .05; Δχ2 (67) = 39.81, p > .05).  
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This model was then tested separately for boys and for girls in an unconstrained 
multiple group model, which was observed to be a very poor fit to the data and was 
significantly weaker than the full sample model as established using the Chi squared 
difference test (χ2 (590) = 891.07, p < .05, CFI = .86, RMSEA > .05;  Δχ
2 (294) = 519.97,  
p <.05). Results are therefore given for the full sample, which represents boys and girls. 
The model containing the interaction was retained as the final model due to the 
conservativeness of the analyses, the slightly better model statistics, and the additional 
information that it provides, as described below. 
 Figure 3.1 displays the standardized coefficients for the significant paths in the 
final model (p < .05, two-tailed test unless otherwise specified; one-tailed tests were 
considered acceptable given that hypotheses regarding direction of associations were 
specified a priori). A significant amount of stability was observed in all measures, and 
was especially strong in peer-reported aggression. Concurrent associations were in the 
expected directions. One important observation is that the victimization level of one’s 
best friend was related to low levels of defending and high levels of aggression 
(concurrently). Beyond these significant autoregressive paths and covariances, significant 
cross lagged paths were observed from T1 aggression to both T2 defending (negative as 
expected) and T2 moral disengagement (positive as expected). Moreover, there was a 
one-tailed trend from T1 moral disengagement to T2 defending (also in the expected 
negative direction). Beyond these main effects, and as expected, there was a significant 
positive interaction between moral disengagement and best friend victimization at T1 in 
predicting T2 defending. As illustrated in Figure 3.2, the slope between moral 
disengagement and subsequent defending varied as a function of the victimization level 
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of one’s best friend. The slope was most negative for those who had a best friend who 
was low on victimization. The slope became more positive with increasing levels of best 
friend victimization. As hypothesized, variance in defending as a function of best friend 
victimization was greatest for those who were highest on moral disengagement.    
Discussion 
Given the critical role that defenders play in curbing bullying at school, studies 
that help clarify the multiple levels of complexity surrounding defending behaviour are 
very much needed. The present study contributed to this important area of research with 
the implementation of a longitudinal design that combined self- and peer-report 
perspectives and that provided greater insight into the mechanisms underlying defending 
behaviour. Findings suggest that children’s motivation to come to the defense of specific 
victims may be influenced by their relationship with the victim. The contextual nature of 
morality was evident in that moral cognitions were selectively expressed as a function of 
friendship. Specifically, moral disengagement, which is a cognitive strategy that is 
postulated to inhibit moral agency (Bandura, 1999), only inhibited defending behaviour 
in those children who have best friends with low levels of victimization. Alternatively, 
the negative association between moral disengagement and defending disappeared for 
those with best friends with the highest levels of victimization; that is, moral 
disengagement no longer accounted for changes in defending behaviour. This effect was 
most pronounced for children who were higher on moral disengagement, a finding 
confirms that although moral disengagement plays a role in predicting defending 
behaviour, the association is not fixed or invariant but that it is instead moderated by 
friendship. More generally, the current study has provided support for Sullivan’s (1953) 
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claim that an essential feature of the friendship experience is an increased sensitivity to 
the needs of one’s friend.   
The possibility that even those children who report the highest levels of moral 
disengagement may defend under particular conditions has important implications. It may 
be the case that friendship provides more selective defenders with a context for the 
socialization of prosocial behaviour. Ideally, this group of children may gain greater 
efficacy in defending that may eventually generalize to non-friends. As suggested by the 
socio-cognitive theory of moral agency (Bandura, 1999), behaviour change may feed 
back into changes in moral cognition. As such, friendships may indeed provide the 
opportunity for moral development (Bukowski & Sippola, 1996). 
The above suggestion that low defending efficacy may account for children’s lack 
of defending is supported by previous research demonstrating the predictive effect of 
efficacy beliefs on defending behaviour (Barchia & Bussey, 2011b; Pöyhönen et al., 
2010; Thorberg & Jungert, 2013). Moral disengagement may serve as an adaptive coping 
strategy for such children as they may not have the skills or resources to defend 
victimized peers. This interpretation is supported by Staub’s (2000) view that internal 
conflict may arise in bystanders who remain morally engaged yet passive when 
witnessing acts of aggression. The current study raises the added question of whether 
some children who are not able to defend just any victimized peer may nonetheless be 
willing and somehow able to defend a specific peer due to friendship motives. If there is 
such a split in the fulfillment of impartial moral obligations (i.e., to non-specific others) 
versus partial moral obligations to friends, then moral disengagement mechanisms may 
be used to bridge this split.  
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Philosophical arguments have been articulated to support the adaptiveness of such 
disengagement strategies. According to Stocker (1976), deontological moral orientations 
lead to a sort of “moral schizophrenia” due to a rift between the universal moral 
reasoning that they advocate and powerful motives stemming from concern for particular 
others (e.g., friends). The current study cannot determine whether moral disengagement 
was used as a coping strategy to heal rifts between moral cognitions and behaviour. 
Continued studies that clarify the over-time interplay between moral disengagement and 
factors such as defending efficacy and social status (e.g., Caravita et al., 2012) may offer 
useful insight into the possibility that some children become morally disengaged because 
(1) defending is much harder for them and (2) they defend some victimized peers but not 
others.  
The current study raises several questions for future research with regard to the 
issue of bystander partiality toward friends versus others. Why might this partiality exist 
and how can it inform interventions aimed at recruiting or training defenders? Studies 
that explore factors such as moral emotions, efficacy, and perceived defending norms as a 
function of a bystander’s relationship with the victim, and the bully, may reveal 
important differences in the prevalence and form of defending.  
Future Directions 
Moral emotions and cognitions. It is believed that a bystander’s motives to 
intervene are subject to the emotions elicited when witnessing a bullying incident (e.g., 
fear, anger, guilt, embarrassment, confusion, shame). These emotions may differ 
depending on whether one is witnessing unfamiliar peers in a bullying situation versus a 
friend being bullied, or perhaps a friend doing the bullying. For example, greater anger 
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(i.e., moral outrage) or concern when witnessing a friend being bullied may explain 
defending in children who may otherwise be passive due to other inhibitory factors (e.g., 
fear, low social status, moral disengagement). With evidence that emotional states shape 
moral judgments (Valdesolo & DeSteno, 2006), potential differences in emotional 
responses may reveal that the act of bullying may be viewed as more wrong because it 
is happening to someone close (Linke, 2012; Slomkowski & Killen, 1992). While the 
widely-used Mechanisms of Moral Disengagement Scale (Bandura et al., 1996) devotes 
several items to such relationally-dependent moral justifications (e.g., “it is alright to 
fight to protect your friends”), more sensitive methodologies are needed given that the 
scale has consistently been found to load onto a single factor even though it aims to 
capture eight theoretical mechanisms.  
Efficacy. The question of whether children find it easier to defend a friend versus 
a non-friend is also worth exploring. Such studies may provide important information 
about factors related to efficacy in one bystander situation over another. For example, is 
there less ambiguity for a bystander when a friend is being bullied? If this is the case, 
then the bystander may have a better idea about whether intervention is necessary and 
how best to intervene, suggesting that certain inhibitory processes typically observed due 
to the bystander effect (Latané & Nida, 1981, Darley & Latané, 1968) may not be as 
pronounced when witnessing a friend being bullied.  
Perceived defending norms. Another highly relevant issue that may help clarify 
bystander motives to defend a friend versus a non-friend relates to whether the peer group 
supports one form of defense over another. If it is the case that defending friends is 
perceived to be more acceptable, and even expected, then passivity due to fear of 
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retaliation from bullies or concern for losing one’s social status may become far less 
likely.  
Group level effects. Much larger studies are needed to tackle questions about the 
effect of these potential differences at the classroom level (e.g., Salmivalli & Voeten, 
2004). For example, do potential differences in friendship-based norms impact the 
frequency of defending in classrooms? Studies that compare classrooms where more 
individual alliances motivate defending versus classrooms where there is greater 
impartiality in defending may provide information for school-wide interventions, such as 
the fostering of a collective ideology and a stronger sense of relatedness among 
classmates. 
Friend influence. Greater statistical power is also needed in order to better 
ascertain the mechanisms underlying the dyadic influence within a friendship. For 
instance, studies that apply the Actor-Partner Interdependence Model (APIM: Kenny, 
Kashy, & Cook, 2006; e.g., Laursen, Hafen, Kerr, & Stattin, 2011) may identify the 
direction of influence between friends within a dyad based on their relative level on key 
attributes (e.g., peer acceptance), and whether the strength and direction of this influence 
varies as a function of different friendship categories (e.g., stable versus unstable dyads, 
girl versus boy dyads). 
Summary 
The findings of the current study provide evidence that defending behaviour is 
shaped by a complex interplay between individual and interpersonal factors, and that 
morality is expressed – or suppressed within a social context. While moral 
disengagement tends to deter prosocial behaviour in general, having a best friend who is 
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victimized motivates defending behaviour even in those highest on moral disengagement. 
Identifying the reasons for this form of partiality in defending behaviour is a valuable 
area for future research. Importantly, those children who were more engaged were also 
more impartial in their defending behaviour, suggesting that continued exploration into 
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Table 3.2.  Correlations between study variables 
 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
1. Sexa – 
         
2. Age .11 – 
        
3. T1 Defending .22* .00 – 
       
4. T2 Defending .46** .03 .63** – 
      
5. T1 Moral disengagement -.19* -.11 -.32** -.32** – 
     
6. T2 Moral disengagement -.22* -.04 -.27** -.31** .66** – 
    
7. T1 Best Frd Victimization -.30** -.08 -.16 -.21* .05 .09 – 
   
8. T2 Best Frd Victimization -.29** -.12 -.07 -.22* .09 .05 .64** – 
  
9. T1 Aggression -.33** -.09 -.35** -.44** .15 .27** .24** .30** – 
 
10. T2 Aggression -.26** .01 -.30** -.39** .09 .15 .21* .31** .86** – 
 









Figure 3.2. The interactive effect of moral disengagement and best friend 
victimization at T1 on T2 defending behaviour 
 






What motivates a child to come to the defense of a bullied school mate? What 
inhibits moral agency in bystanders who witness a peer being harassed? Or rather, what 
motivates bystanders to support a bully’s aggression? These are some of the questions at 
the forefront of bullying research. The findings from this three-study project provide 
answers to these questions.  They also point to several new avenues of inquiry to guide 
future research.  
Study 1 tested longitudinal associations between moral disengagement and 
bystander behaviours. The overall pattern of results was consistent with Bandura’s (1999) 
socio-cognitive theory of moral agency, offering partial support for the existence of a 
reciprocal relationship between moral thought and behaviour. Such a reciprocal 
relationship has important implications for intervention strategies, particularly in terms of 
the use of cognitive-behavioural approaches (e.g., Mennuti, Christner, & Freeman, 2012). 
These approaches are based on the premise that overall change may be achieved by 
targeting cognitions and behaviours either separately or in combination, with change in 
one influencing change in the other. Therefore, increased prosocial behaviour may be 
achieved by challenging children’s morally disengaged cognitions just as the reduction of 
children’s legitimization of aggression may be achieved by training prosocial behaviour.  
The design of such interventions may need to also consider important sex 
differences and methodological issues that were highlighted, particularly with regard to 
the use of peer-nomination versus self-report tools and that corresponded to differences in 
how bystander behaviours feed into – or are fed by moral disengagement strategies. 
Although Study 1 provided support for targeting change in moral disengagement as a 
way to recruit passive bystanders to intervene in defense of victims, the findings 
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presented in Chapters 2 and 3 shed light on the complexity of bystander behaviour, or 
rather the simplicity of conceptualizing bystander behaviour solely along a moral 
dimension. 
In Chapter 2, fundamental personality traits were found to moderate the 
association between moral disengagement and bystander behaviours, thus demonstrating 
the limitations of a uni-dimensional measurement of bystander behaviours (i.e., 
defending as “moral” or bully reinforcing as “immoral”). Specifically, low levels of 
moral disengagement were not sufficient to predict prosocial behaviour and high levels of 
moral disengagement were not sufficient to predict aggressive or passive behaviours. 
Greater sensitivity to the potential predictors of these bystander behaviours was achieved 
by taking a closer look at the moderating effects of two basic temperamental response 
tendencies. This closer focus revealed a complex pattern of heterogeneity in morally 
engaged and disengaged children. Morally engaged children with greater BIS sensitivity 
showed a pattern of both higher defending and higher passive bystanding during bullying 
situations. It seems then that defending behaviour is not necessarily inhibited in high BIS 
sensitive children: some high BIS children, especially morally engaged ones, may not 
perceive conflicting cues in bullying situations and may therefore not be encumbered by 
the otherwise inhibitory forces of a higher BIS. Stated differently, high BIS 
responsiveness may only inhibit behaviour that conflicts with moral thoughts, an 
interpretation that was also in line with the result that aggression was less likely in high 
BIS children only if they were morally engaged. In contrast, high BIS children were also 
found to remain passive (i.e., inhibited), but their corresponding low levels of moral 
disengagement suggests that their passivity does not necessarily mean that they are 
morally disconnected from the plight of their victimized peers. Future studies that take a 
107 
 
more thorough look at this group of morally engaged yet high BIS children may help 
clarify why some defend while others remain passive. Another issue that warrants further 
study, and that may also account for the heterogeneity in bystander behaviour is the 
overlap between defending and passive bystanding behaviour that was found, and that 
replicates previous research (e.g., Gini, 2006). In other words, it is important to 
understand the situational factors that contribute to a given child choosing to defend in 
one context yet remain passive in another. 
BAS sensitivity also modulated the association between moral disengagement and 
bystander behaviours in a way that elucidated important parallels between defenders and 
bully reinforcers, despite the qualitative difference between these two forms of bystander 
behaviour. Higher levels of BAS amplified defending as well as bully reinforcing, but 
only if the behaviour matched moral cognitions (i.e., moral engagement for defending 
and moral disengagement for bully reinforcing). Taken together, the findings of Study 2 
suggest that there is no “one size fits all” approach to the recruitment of peer defenders, 
and that greater sensitivity should be afforded to assessing the complex interplay between 
moral thoughts and actions. Given the novelty of this particular line of research, 
replication of findings is required, in addition to larger scale studies that track the 
associations among personality, morality, and bystander behaviour over time. 
The study described in Chapter 3 ventured into the highly relevant, yet rarely 
explored domain of the relationship between a bystander and a victim. The study was 
based on the premise that friendship motivates moral action (Bukowski & Sippola, 1996). 
As expected, children with best friends who were victimized were higher on defending 
even though they may have reported higher levels of moral disengagement.As such, 
moral behaviour seems to be embedded within both an individual and interpersonal 
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context (Bronfenbrenner, 1979). Furthermore, findings suggest that a separate moral code 
exists for those closest to us (Blum, 1990, p. 46). Continued exploration into the social 
context surrounding bystander behaviour is a necessary yet little investigated area of 
research. Getting to the roots of what bystanders feel and think when they witness a 
victimized peer is imperative to understanding how to motivate defender behaviour. 
Learning how these thoughts and feelings vary as a function of the relationship between 
the bystander and the victim – or the bystander and the bully for that matter – must be 
explored.      
To conclude, the vast majority of research on peer victimization and bullying has 
implicated characteristics of bullies and their victims as targets for intervention. The 
current thesis was inspired by conceptualizations of bullying as a phenomenon that arises 
and is diffused within a group context (e.g., Salmivalli et al., 1996). Such 
conceptualizations promote the recruitment of bystanders in attempts to reduce school 
bullying. The overall findings have implications for the design of interventions aimed at 
enlisting students to come to the defense of their victimized peers, particularly with 
regard to the importance of challenging moral cognitions, which in fact were found to 
contribute to bystander behaviours. After all, altering thoughts that inhibit children’s 
moral agency during fundamentally unjust situations such as bullying is a valid target for 
intervention. Finally, the thesis also highlighted how the impact of moral cognitions on 
behaviour may depend on individual differences in personality as well as the friendship 
context, thus providing more nuanced information to guide theory and research, and to 
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ONE WORLD WHOLE CHILD PROJECT 
 




Please read and sign the following: 
 
I know that my daughter/son has been asked to be in a study conducted by Dr. W. M. 
Bukowski.  
 
I know that the study is about children's experiences with their parents, friends, and 
teachers and their adjustment.  I know that if my daughter/son participates she/he will be 
asked to answer some questionnaires at his/her desk in the classroom. I have been told 
that the questionnaires are about how young people think and feel about themselves and 
their friends. I know that the children will complete the questionnaires three times across 
the school year and that they will be brought to the PERForn Centre at Concordia for a 
set of physical assessments. I  know also that all participating children will receive a gift 
of school supplies and a t-shirt from the research team at the conclusion of the final data 
collection. 
 
I know that my daughter/son does not have to be in the study.  I know also that even if 
she/he starts to be in it but changes her/his mind she/he can quit at any time. I also know 
that all answers are confidential and will NOT be shown to anyone. Only Dr. Bukowski 
and his assistants will know what is in the questionnaires. 
 
Please check one of the following and ask your daughter/son to bring this permission slip 
into the homeroom class tomorrow. 
 
____ My son/daughter has permission to take part in Dr. Bukowski’s study 
 
 




Parent’s Name:  ______________________ PHONE: (_____)_________________ 
 
 
Signature:    ______________________ DATE: ________________________ 
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ONE WORLD WHOLE CHILD  STUDY 
 
PRIMARY FIVE & SIX 
 
 




I understand that I have been asked to take part in a study about children’s behaviours 
and well-being. I have been told by Dr William M. Bukowski that the purpose of the 
study is to collect information about how children’s skills and behaviours are related to 
their healthy well-being and adjustment. 
 
I have been told that I will be asked to complete some questionnaires that are about how 
young people think and feel about themselves and their friends and family. I know that I 
will complete the questionnaires five times across the school year.  Two of these times 
will last about an hour.  The other three times will take 30 minutes. I know also that all 
participating children will receive a gift of school supplies and a t-shirt from the research 
team at the conclusion of the final data collection. 
  
Dr Bukowski has informed me that (a) my participation is voluntary; (b) I do not have to 
answer the questionnaires if I do not want to, and (c) I can end my participation at any 
time.  I have also been told that my answers will be confidential. 
  








TODAY’S DATE________________________________________  
 
